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I This \ppc il is presenJel fo lliis coin I on the glimmer of hope that justice, fairness can 
transpire rather than the court merely ignoring what is said, because I have been loud-spoken 
tf yirtg to fight for what is right, ai id i i ly i ight as a Fatl ler and a litigant, rather than just bowing 
down to the unethical conduct of opposing counsel, or false representations of the ^ ! 
Otherwise, everyone that fights for right will just be swept aside and continue ;o !o \ L'imzed 
by those liMi! hive, the « oiht i iAf, or proicrence. 
2. As noted below, he n -.ny filings of the Appellant to the District Court have never been 
properly .; eee •_ y i ^ . .;• "i. • • ></* .< .i .; January 9, 2006 signing of the Supplemental Decree, 
the issues the Respondent had presented after the Augi ist 3, 2005 hearing wei e m\ ei heai d by 
the court either because they were "reserved" or continued without a date, See 8-18-06 filed 
note from, Con n nissioner and see 1 -9-06 1 -11 -06 & 1 18 06 docketed filings. 
3. This is an Appeal, to establish What is the Appellant's Rights and what is the Appellee"s 
requirement to conform to representations made August 3, 2005 but not signed until 
January 9, 2006, and what must the Appellant do,, or file to get the court in hear and 
consider the applicable facts or evidence, and when is the actual date of an order 
binding upon a party or the court, and can the party be found in contempt of an 
unsigned order until it is signed ? See the many filings noted below from the Respondent 
trying to exercise his rights, or get the court to hear the facts and evidence against the 
Appellee, and still the court refuses. Thus, the Appellee escapes accoi intability for 1 ler actic ns 
or conduct, and blatant non compliance to court, orders.. 
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4. This is an Appeal because the Appellant was prejudiced by the District Court's failure or 
refusal to hear matters about problems that dramatically affected the parties' August 3, 2005 
agreement (see problems noted below that Judge Medley stated in the August 3, 2005 hearing 
that he would not address or "fix" unless he was required to do so, and also as shown in 
hearing on 12-12-05, Appellant asked the court what about the previously filed issues? (See 
12-12-05 transcript, page 71, line # 15 page 72, Line #14, where the Judge said: 
"he was not going to those issues at this point
 ?,9 There is new information that has been 
revealed, different from the August 3rd hearing date, ... they need to be considered because 
they magnified the question suspect the so called agreement, and without being able to speak, 
I have been or will be prejudiced.... I am not going to hear anymore from you at this point 
We will recess ".): 
5. This Appeal is also to establish if the Appellant had rights, and merit to have judgement 
against him set aside, or stayed until his appeal had been heard or ruled on, and was unjustly 
denied hearing of his financial matters due to the court's imposed ban and refusal to set aside 
ban judgment while appeal was pending but then later used the same issue as grounds not to 
hear a matter pending the appeal. See 12-21-06 docketed note. "ISSUES RELATED TO 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE NOT ADDRESSED DUE TO APPEAL" AND TO DATE, 
never have been addressed by the District Court. Thus, the Appellant has been unjustly 
prejudiced in being unable to obtain judgement against the Appellee for her actions and non 
compliance to the orders of the court, and representations she made, to entice agreement of 
the Appellant. 
5. This Appeal is presented because the Appellant was denied opportunity to present his off 
setting financial matters to the court in an Evidentiary Hearing even though on 10-11-07 
Judge Medley noted the court Docket "Hearing is Granted in Full" yet as the hearing 
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approached and transpired, the record, and the transcripts all show that such hearing of the 
Appellant's financial issues was never allowed to transpire or be heard, and thus the offsetting 
financial and related matters were never properly considered by the District Court when 
issuing the Court's Order that this Appeal is of. 10-22-07 Respondent's Order Certifying 
Petitioners' Contempt was unsigned by the court, and thus the Appellant was denied his rights 
and judgments against the Appellee for her contempt and non compliance or actions. 
7. This is an appeal of the fact the District Court denied hearing on October 19, 2007 of any of 
the Respondent's issues that the Commissioner had found in favor of the Respondent or that 
the Appellee had failed to comply with from the parties April 20, 2006 order as noted by 
Judge Medley's docketed note of 11-8-06 when he stated the Evidentiary hearing was only 
on paragraph # 10, of the April 20, 2006 Order and such Evidentiary hearing was scheduled 
for January 5, 2007, and then subsequently delayed and continued until October 19, 2007. 
Review of the whole entire Order of April 20, 2006 shows the Petitioner violated many of it's 
provisions and failed to comply and make the court ordered payments and has yet to be held 
accountable or responsible for her actions. 
8. This is an appeal to determine if the District Court unfairly rejected the Respondent's filed 
amounts due on 9-20-07 as filed in the court docket as offsetting amounts the Appellee should 
pay the Appellant, given the Commissioners ruling of Exhibit # , document # 
that specifically addresses "the need to continue the sanction against the Appellant is 
no longer needed given the lack of collection efforts by the Appellee, and the passage of 
time that has shown the Appellee's conduct is less than reputable as well." 
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9. This is an appeal to determine if the District Court failed to act in the Best interests of the 
children, when the GAL stated they find it was in the best interests of the children to have all 
the matters certified for trial, and not just the Appellee's matters certified for evidentiary 
Hearing See 8-9-07 hearing note of what the GAL presented to the court as the docketed 
court entry. The court states the issues could be heard October 19, 2007 but will wait to find 
out what issues are certified. Then later, the Appellant is prevented from presenting his 
financial matters to the court for consideration in an Evidentiary Hearing. The Order is 
created without an Evidentiary Hearing. 
10. This is an Appeal to determine if the District Court unjustly denied the Appellant's motion to 
have other items of value held by the court as bond (Rule 62 & judgement against the 
Appellant) while the Appellant's issues were allowed to be heard for the Appellant to get 
offsetting amounts against the Appellee. 
11. This is an Appeal for clarification ruling as to what the District Court should consider when 
during the interim time of court hearing (August 3, 2005, and the date the court signs the 
order (January 9, 2006) when it is made known by the Appellee's actions, and willful refusal 
to be bound by her August 3, 2005 representations and agreement. This is an Appeal to direct 
how, or when can the Appellant present to the court for consideration or "fixing the 
problems" that the Appellee's non compliance and refusal to comply brings to the Appellant. 
12. This is an Appeal to determine if the District Court should hold hearing on the Appellee's 
failure to comply or be bound by her agreement or representations of August 3, 2005, prior to 
the actual court signing of the Order on January 9, 2006, or if such egregious conduct of the 
Appellee is merely ignored by the court. 
13. This is an Appeal to determine if the Appellant is entitled judgement against the Appellee for 
her non-compliant actions and effects of her conduct Nunc pro Tunc even before the January 
9, 2006 signing date of the order and thereafter. 
14. This is an Appeal to determine if or is a party able to be found in contempt of, or bound by, an 
order of the court before the order is even signed by the court? Ie: August 2005 Appellee 
makes representations that she would not move and continue paying the mortgages on the 
marital home until it is sold, but the court does not sign that order until January 2006. In the 
meantime however, in October 2005, the Appellee demonstrates by her actions her refusal to 
be bound or comply with the representations she made in August 2005, by abandoning the 
marital residence and failing to make the applicable monthly mortgage payments on the marital 
home. Additionally, the Appellee willfully and voluntarily without cause terminated her 
medical coverage insurance she was ordered to carry on the children, and also failed to deliver 
the children to Utah for their visitation on either Thanksgiving, or Christmas 2005, even 
though her representations and negotiations in August 2005 were that she would deliver the 
children from that point on 3 times per calendar year on her own expense for visitation with 
their father. 
15. This is an Appeal to clarify what must the Appellant do, file, with the court to inform the 
Judge of problems for him to "fix" as he said he would if he was required to do so, and how 
long the Appellant must wait before the Judge would act to "fix" the problems he recognized 
to exist in August 2005 hearing, but still allowed to continue or exist. 
16. The October 2007 judgement this appeal is for, is sought to be reversed and remanded back to 
District Court based on the fact that the Appellee failed to comply with orders of the court, 
and the Appellant's issues were not allowed proper or full consideration of fact or evidence, 
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as well as because of the comments and the statements of Judge Medley refusing to resolve 
the issues unless he is required to do so.(see August 3, 2005 transcript noting his comments as 
shown below). The Appellant has only tried to bring resolution to the issues, and to obtain a 
Divorce Decree that complies with State Statute, and yet has been thwarted all along the way. 
The Appellant has never attempted to deny the children what they are to have, or expenses 
that are truly his. He has just been unable to pay such expenses given the extreme financial 
hardship the Appellee's actions have placed upon the Appellant. Had the District Court 
allowed hearing of the Appellant's issues (see October 19, 2007 hearing notice from Judge 
Medley stating the Only purpose of the October 19, 2007 hearing was that narrow scope of 
the Appellee's issues of the Appellant's non-compliance, and none of the Appellant's issues 
against the Appellee were allowed hearing). The order this appeals was signed thereafter by 
the court. 
17. Furthermore, the attorney fees awarded to the Appellant, and the District Court be directed to 
lift, dismiss, or set aside the $3,300.00 ban against the Appellant so he may be allowed to 
present his issues for judgement and offsetting amounts against the Appellee. Such 
assessment against the Appellant as attorney fees was unjust assessment or ban given the 
comments and intentions of the District Court (discussed below) to not resolve the parties 
joint financial obligations, debts, and matters that were discovered or arose after the parties' 
August 3, 2005 court appearance or were fraudulently kept from being disclosed by the 
Appellee or her counsel for consideration by the court or Appellant in the August 3, 2005 
hearing. 
18. This Appeal MAINLY seeks among other things to: Establish, Clarify, & Determine what 
date is the controlling or binding date this Appeals Court in it's May 1, 2008 Appeals Court 
6 
ruling considered as the financial responsibility of the Appellee was responsible for the marital 
debt that she was to resolve the debt, or "took on" that specifically stated, on top of page 3 of 
the ruling issued, but that the District Court refuses to consider or enforce for the 
Appellant that states: (Note: Divorce proceedings initially began by Appellee June 1, 2001.) 
... in this matter or in the past proceedings for protective orders" when 
read in unison, it is clear that final obligations for any debts, bills, or other costs 
incurred during the course of the divorce proceedings, unless expressly stated 
otherwise, were to be borne by the party that was previously ordered to resolve 
that debt or had otherwise taken on thai obligation ". 
THEREFORE, based on such ruling of the Appeals Court, the Appellee is financially 
responsible to continue making the $1,600.00 monthly mortgage payments on the parties' 
marital home or face accountability and consequence for her outright refusal to comply 
with such financial obligation. 
Since the parties' joint debt obligation extends far beyond the date of the parties' Supplemental 
Decree, and such was silent in the Supplemental Decree; The Question for consideration is: Does 
this statement by the Utah Appeals Court include the America First Credit Union Joint account 
that the Appellee took (or was found out & discovered) after the August 3, 2005 and used 
contrary to orders of the court, and does it also include the two mortgages (total $1,600.00 per 
month) on the parties' marital residence the Appellee when after the divorce proceedings were 
already initiated and filed in the court, was given the choice by Commissioner Casey (see July 25, 
2001 transcript and Order of the court) chose in July 2001 to be her residence, and elected to 
reside in until October 2005 when she just up and abandoned that residence without any attempt 
to make significant continuing payments (except for a trivial amount thereafter) and was ordered 
by the District Court on March & April 2006 to continue making the monthly mortgage payments 
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on even though she voluntarily quit her job without having another one lined up, and abandoned 
the property and just left it without any provision for the $1,600.00 per month monthly mortgage 
payment to be made? (note: the District Court's order of August 2004 stated if the Appellee left 
the marital residence, then provisions would have to be made by the parties for payment of the 
mortgage amounts due, yet still the Appellee failed to comply with such order of the District 
Court). Thus, the Appellant is entitled to seek judgement against the Appellee for her refusal to 
pay her financial responsibilities ordered of her by the District Court. 
The Appellant attempted to; and is entitled to, having judgements against him set aside pending 
the appeal of his issues, and hearing of the financial issues against the Appellee in favor of the 
Appellant. Consequently, had the District Court allowed such stay of judgement pending appeal 
when the Appellant had asked the District Court for such many times, while the first appeal (ruled 
on May 1, 2008 by this Appeals Court) was under process and awaiting final ruling by this court, 
the Appellant's issues could have been fully and properly heard, and the two judgement amounts 
netted against each other for a total amount due from the Appellee in favor of the Appellant. 
Thus, Attorney fees assessed against the Appellant would also not be warranted or attorney fees 
of the Appellant assessed against the Appellee would also be warranted since much of that time 
the Appellant was represented by counsel. Thus, the ruling of May 1, 2008, though after the date 
of judgement this Appeal attempts to appeal, has bearing and relevance to this October 2007 
Order of judgement against the Appellant, since this Appeals Court Affirmed that the Appellee 
was to pay for the marital debt she had assumed as the marital home, and was previously ordered 
by the District Court to pay. 
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In addition to that above, this Appeal further seeks to: 
1. Establish, Clarify, & Determine what date is the controlling or binding date of an 
Agreement that prevents it from being changed, modified or rescinded?: August 3, 2005, 
or January 9, 2006. Prior to the District Court's signing the order on January 9, 2006, the 
Appellant submitted modifications to, and rescinding of the agreement of August 3, 2005. 
Thus, the Appellant acted within his right, to rescind the agreement, seek modification, 
and also to inform the court of apparent fraud of the Appellee, and the errors of the 
proposed order, all prior to the judge signing the Supplemental Decree on January 9, 
2006. Therefore, the court then using such filings of the Appellant as basis to assess 
attorney fees as a ban to justice against the Appellant was unjust. Such ban against the 
Appellant caused the District Court to refuse hearing the Appellant's issues to counter the 
claims or judgement against him brought by the Appellee. 
2. Establish, Clarify, & Determine if under Rule 62 regarding supercedes bond, can a party 
either request or place with the court consideration of amounts due from the other party in 
the lawsuit as bond to net against judgements already entered against the first party, and 
was the Appellant unjustly denied such by the District Court given that rule specifies such 
is available or applicable not just to the Appellate Court. (See August 3, 2005 hearing 
transcript page 21, line # 19-24 that directs that funds would be held by the court until the 
issues were fully resolved), "what if they (Appellee & her attorney) take their money and 
there is not enough money to resolve their indebtedness?". In many of the Respondent's 
letters to the Commissioner, and other filed attempts (see filed spreadsheet showing net 
amounts due each party) for the court to consider the amounts due the Appellant from the 
Appellee, the Appellant asked the court to hold or consider the many amounts owed the 
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Appellant (even the Supplemental Decree provision of $5,000.00 that was to be payable to 
the Appellant from the marital residence proceeds. Yet, the Commissioner in his many 
minute entries stated such was not possible or something that could be done, and that the 
Appellant was in error to think that amounts owed him by Appellee could be either held by 
the court as bond, or used to net against what the Appellant owed the Appellee. 
3. To determine if the Appellant was unjustly denied setting aside the $3,300.00 ban against 
him that blocked his issues from being heard by the District Court that would have 
negated or greatly reduced the amount of judgement this is an appeal of while his case was 
under appeal with this Utah Appeals Court. 
4. Obtain clarification from the court as to what forms or methods are to be followed and 
also to be considered by the court during the period BETWEEN the August 3, 2005 court 
hearing, and January 9, 2006 when the District Court signed the parties' UN-Agreed to 
Court inflicted Supplemental Decree, that attempted to bind Annabelle Stone (non party) 
to the divorce decree. The court, (though the order attempts otherwise), tries to hold 
Annabelle Stone responsible for the debts of Joanne Stone. Such is contrary to justice and 
was addressed in the U.S. Supreme Court case Morris v Williams No- 05-1256^ where 
the court attempts to punish a party that is not before the court. The court held that 
such conduct ". ..would amount to a taking of "property" from the defendant without 
due process". Such is the case of this appeal, the District Court has issued judgement 
(take property from), against the Appellant, without due process because of the actions of 
parties that are not properly brought before this Divorce Court, or bound by it's August 3, 
2005 (Jan. 9, 2006) Supplemental Decree Order. At first, the Appellant filed motions for 
the court to consider the facts and evidence and hold hearing on such, then later the 
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Appellant filed Petition to Modify If the order had not been signed by the court until 
January 9, 2006, then a Motion for the court to consider or hold hearing on an issue of 
fraud, error, or newly discovered fact would be appropriate for the Appellant to have filed, 
and then for the court to properly hold evidentiary hearing of However, the District 
Court merely rejected, and refused to consider the Appellant's filings or motions from late 
in 2005 Then the Appellant was told to file a Petition to Modify a decree, and did so, and 
again the District Court refused to consider it or allow hearing of the facts or evidence 
5 Obtain ruling from this court as to how, and when is the Appellant entitled to have the 
District Court Judge act as he so stated he would in the parties' August 3, 2005 hearing to 
"FIX" and what is required of the Appellant to file with the court, to 2et the Judge 
to "fix" the parties settlement with what he would be "required to do" (is a Motion to 
inform the Judge of the need to review and "fix" something appropriate before the Judge 
signs the Order or after he does sign it) with what he saw as the following problems with 
the parties' Supplemental Decree (see August 3, 2005 transcript) 
a) Page 24, line # 3 "the problem is we don't have a deal if one, the properties aren't listed, and 
two, the $40,000 00 is not divided as agreed upon", 
b) Page 24, line # 10, "I recognize we have an issue as to the sale of this property which is totally 
impossible to resolve today That's an issue that's going to have to be resolved (soon) (sic) ", 
c) Page 24, line # 24, " if it turns out that Ms Annabelle Stone will not participate in the sale, 
then I will have to return at that point in time, if that anses, what impact it has on the settlement 
agreement", 
d) Page 25, line # 6, " I will take that measure, if I'm required to do so, at the appropriate point in 
time", 
e) Page 25, line # "it will become a matter of enforcement perhaps", 
f) Page 26, line #11," I obviously can't force a stipulation on the parties It is not something that 
I can do ", 
g) Page 26, line # 23, "But at the same time I'm not going to cross that bridge if I'm required to 
cross it if, in fact, we have a problem with Ms Stone's consent as we've described ", 
h) And again on page 27, line # 18, Judge medley states "it is hard to inject objectivity because of 
the nature of the relationships themselves" , 
i) Then Judge Medley's blatantly expressed refusal to have a qualifying order for the parties, and 
thus force and cause greater litigation and prolonged resolution in the courts when he stated on 
page 28, line # 1 where he, " literally signed the transcript as the final judgement and decree 
in the case and let you take it from there" Showing his actions will only cause more court 
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involvement, and that the issues would not be resolved with that Supplemental Decree, thus 
supporting the Supplemental Decree is NOT the final Order of the case, and the District Court 
anticipated the Appellant to file motions or filings to seek resolution of the matters Judge Medley 
saw as problems and refused to resolve then, or even resolve in the Order or Supplemental 
Decree. 
Thus, the Appellant's filings were actually justified and expected based on the 
Judges inaction's to resolve or "fix" his erroneous or lacking supplemental Decree. Yet 
the Commissioner instead assessed a ban of $3,300.00 against the Appellant for filing 
such. Thus the court's use of this $3,300.00 ban was unjustified and prejudicial against 
the Appellant, because it was used by the Appellee, and the court to avoid dealing with the 
issues of the Appellee's conduct or contempt, or fix the problems it created. 
Set aside the court's October 19, 2007 Order and subsequent Orders against the Appellant 
until the court properly and completely hears the Appellant's issues, and evidence against 
the Appellee, and then make adjustment to assessed attorney fees and judgment amounts 
due for the error of the court in failing to fully and properly consider the Appellant's 
financial issues that he had filed and requested hearing of against the Appellee. 
Appeal, and overturn the District Court's October 19, 2007 order of Judgement against 
the Appellant that resulted because the District Court would not allow consideration or 
presenting of fact or evidence against the Appellee, but would ONLY consider the issues 
presented by the Appellee against the Appellant. 
Appeal the District Court's refusal to consider facts & evidence from the Appellant. Had 
the District Court considered all of the facts and evidence against the Appellee, in favor of 
the Appellant, and any other remaining evidence against the Appellant, if they had been 
allowed to be considered in unison, the evidence would show it would not be justified to 
issue judgement in the amounts only against the Appellant and allow the Appellee to 
escape accountability of her actions. The evidence and the facts all show the Appellee 
owes the Appellant far more money than the Appellant may owe the Appellee, and as 
such, the amount of this and other orders or judgements against the Appellant would be 
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netted to zero judgement against the Appellant, thus subsequent judgments against the 
Appellant be modified or overturned. 
Determination as to what is the Pro Rata cost of insurance coverage expense of a 
parties' minor children. OR, is it the actual pro rata cost for the children added to the 
parents' coverage, or the entire cost of the parent's coverage and the child's coverage. 
a) I.e. example: Medical insurance coverage of a single party is $250.00 per month, and the 
additional cost for the 3 children (2 minors and one 19 year old adult child living at home) to be 
included is $100.00 more. Thus, the Appellant's pro-rata share of medical insurance coverage 
for the parties5 minor children as the decree so specifies is Vi of(2/3's of the $100.00) or Vi of 
$66.00 per month, not Vi of the total $350.00 per month insurance cost. 
b) If a decree does not specify the Appellant is also responsible for the medical 
insurance expense of the Appellee, the Appellant is not responsible to pay Vi of the 
medical insurance expense of the Appellee? Otherwise, such would be abuse of 
the legal system and unjust enrichment for the Appellee. The Appellant was 
assessed Vi of the entire medical insurance costs for both the Appellee, and for the 
adult child, and for the minor children, when the parties' decree specifically states 
".. .the Appellant is to pay V2 of the pro-rata costs of medical insurance for the 
minor children" See item # 45 of the parties' Supplemental Decree signed January 
9, 2006. 
If the Parties' Supplemental Decree specifically states the Appellee is to provide medical 
coverage for the parties children and she voluntarily refused to do so for a long period of 
time, Doesn't the Appellant have grounds for the court to find the Appellee in contempt of 
court order specifying she was to provide medical insurance coverage for the children? 
Ruling that a different Commissioner and Judge be assigned to resolve the Appellant's 
issues, because of the false and incorrect assumptions by the Commissioner and the Judge 
stated position that he (or Commissioner) finds it difficult to inject objectivity because of 
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the nature of the parties, and their past involvement with each and the court. The 
Appellant is a victim of the court's actions, errors, oversight, or bias and prejudice and it's 
favorable treatment it extended to the Appellee. Furthermore, the Appellant is a victim of 
the Appellee using the court's ban against him in her effort to escape accountability and 
financial responsibility for her actions. 
Determination of Nunc pro Tunc amounts of the proper child Support amount, and 
Medical costs and Insurance Premium costs as judgement to be offset by the judgements 
against the Appellee for her failure to comply with the February, & March, & April, 2006 
Orders of the court, and the parties' Supplemental Decree provisions for travel & 
visitation for the parties' children and other subsequent orders of the court that she has 
refused to comply with, and other matters filed by the Appellant but ignored by the 
District Court. 
Determine the then current statutorily directed amount of child support to be assessed 
against the Appellant, given his unforeseen permanent disability and lengthy time away 
from work without wages. Had opposing counsel performed ethically and prepared the 
statutory child support calculation worksheet as is required of divorcing parties with 
children, using the Appellant's then current wage of $10.24 per hour, the calculated child 
support without consideration of the Appellant's injury and disability, would have only 
been Approximately $400.00 per month, not the $600.00 per month that was assessed 
against the Appellant and this appeals judgement of $3,600.00 for 6 months assessment) 
However, the Appellee had failed to disclose her new wage after leaving her employment 
to come up with actual #'s that would apply for child support and tax benefit reward. If 
the Appellant was allowed the tax advantage of the children, the Appellant would not have 
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had to pay such significant Income Tax amounts as well. The Appellant filed motion with 
the court to hear the Income Tax issue, but still the court refused such consideration. 
Had the District Court allowed consideration of the Appellant's injury, and disability and 
subsequent loss of earning capacity or wages, the court in it's October 2007 judgment this 
appeals, would have found a much smaller amount of judgement against the Appellant if 
any at all. 
Furthermore, if the court had reviewed the evidence as to, or in line with the then current 
and standing orders of the court, that the children were to remain with the Appellant if the 
Appellee moved away, then the amount of child support judgement would be against the 
Appellee to pay to the Appellant, rather than against the Appellant. The "in between 
time" from the August 3, 2005 hearing and the January 9, 2006 signing date of the court's 
order left a lot of time for many issues to be clouded, and severely changed or altered from 
what the parties' original representations and negotiations were on August 3, 2005. 
If an order is not binding or to be considered for contempt or conduct of or upon the 
parties conduct or such until it is signed by the court, then the Appellant recognizes he 
would be liable for Alimony as well (see Respondent's 12-28-05 filed Motion to Modify 
Child Support, Tax Advantages, and Alimony) review of such with the children staying 
here and the Appellant out of work, Alimony would be justified to be awarded to the 
Appellant, but the Appellee never sought to obtain Alimony against the Appellant for the 
"in between period, and the Appellant was never allowed the opportunity to present such 
to the court or have his claim or issues fully heard by the court. This would also be fair or 
equal and supported by the facts if all other facts and such for the same "in between time 
were also applied equally to the Appellant. 
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17. Determine the actual scheduled decrease in child support assessed against the Appellant 
when each child reached adulthood and was emancipated, rather than the way opposing 
counsel changed his representations, and the Appellant is still having to pay the same 
amount of child support for two minor children as he was paying for the three minor 
children irrespective of the statutory increase of 2007 and 2008 of child support amounts 
that are not a part of the calculations at hand before or for consideration by the court. The 
Appellant is still being assessed the full amount of child support for three children even 
though the parties oldest child is almost 20 years old and has graduated from High school 
over a year ago. This is a result of the District Court's refusal to consider or hear the 
Appellant's filed issues, seeking correction of the error of the Supplemental Decree as 
signed by the court. 
First Argument: The Appellant was denied proper consideration of the filings he submitted 
to the court since the parties' August 3, 2005 hearing for their 
Supplemental Divorce Decree. 
Second Argument: The District Court failed to uphold it's duty to enforce the terms of a 
legally binding mortgage contract against the Appellee that the Appellee 
had contracted and entered into, and was ordered to continue paying. 
The District Court refused to allow Appellant hearing of evidence or court 
enforcement of its' Post Decree Orders against the Appellee, specifically 
it's April 20, 2006 signed order that specified the Appellee was to continue 
making the monthly mortgage payments on the parties' marital residence, 
and all that was covered by such payments, or face consequence for not 
complying with such order of the court. 
Had the District Court allowed fiill consideration of the evidence against 
the Appellee, the judgement against the Appellant would not be justified 
without offsetting judgements against the Appellee for amounts attributable 
to her conduct. 
Appellant was unjustly denied his right under Rules of Civil Procedure 
pertaining to Supercedes Bond, to setting aside judgement ($3,300.00 Ban) 
Third Argument: 
Fourth Argument 
Fifth Argument: 
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against him while the matters were under appeal or further consideration of 
the evidence by the court of applicable matters. Such conduct afforded the 
Appellee unjust advantage and preferential treatment by the court. 
The District Court issued its' $3,300.00 ban against the Appellant in error 
due to it's unclear understanding of the facts and evidence, and lack of 
objectivity, and confusion as to what period of time the Appellee's attorney 
fees were to be paid by Appellee: up to August 3, 2005 or up to the date 
when the order was signed by the court of January 9, 2006. 
The District Court assessed the excess insurance premium amount against 
the Appellant of Vi of the insurance premium amount of the Appellee's own 
medical insurance, rather than just the "Pro rata cost of the increase of 
premium for just the minor children". Thus the judgement of insurance 
premium amount is excessive and provides for unjust enrichment of the 
Appellee, and thus the judgement of September 10, 2007 against the 
Appellant that this appeals should be reversed and dismissed until full 
hearing of the Appellant's facts is held by the District Court and ruling of 
what "pro-rata" is to be. 
Commissioner Casey had ruled (many times since February 8, 2006 when we first met (after the 
January 9, 2006 hearing where the court signed the Supplemental Decree) on issues that were 
reserved or "post Decree matters" or subsequent to August 3, 2005 decree matters, and also on 
items that were reserved from the January 9, 2006 decree hearing with Judge Medley, that 
Appellant (Respondent) could seek enforcement of Decree provisions as well as bring "new" or 
"post" decree issues to the court for resolution and hearing. Then when the Appellant attempted 
to bring such "decree enforcement" or "new or post decree" issues to the court, the Appellant 
was rejected, and denied his right to court on many occasions both prior to the $3,300.00 ban 
issue (discussed later below) issued against the Appellant and after such ban was issued against 
the Appellant. 
Without having heard all applicable facts or evidence, the court was not fully 
informed to make unbiased ruling 
Sixth Argument: 
Seventh Argument: 
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1. The Court appeared to be confused as to what type of filing was to be filed by the 
Appellant to bring the appropriate matter to the court for consideration for August 2005 
to January 2006 matters. 
2. When the Appellant brought "new" issues to be heard by the District Court, the 
Commissioner's court just assumed incorrect facts or assumed incorrectly that the issue 
had already been resolved by Judge Medley's January 9, 2006 order when in fact the 
issues had not been resolved. 
3. The Commissioner's Court issued a $3,300 ban against the Appellant because they felt the 
Appellant was over zealous in presenting matters to the court, even though the matters 
presented for consideration, needed to be considered by the court, and the Appellant held 
such right, in order for justice to be served. For example, when the Appellant suffered a 
permanent injury and disability after August 3, 2005 from an industrial accident, and 
unable to work, the Appellant sought modification of his child support amount. 
4. The District Court refused to consider amounts the Appellee took out of the parties' joint 
account at America First Credit Union that were in violation of the court's previous 
Orders. 
5. The District Court scheduled the matters presented by the Appellee for about $5,000.00 
for judgement against the Appellant. However, the District Court would not allow 
hearing or consideration of the issues related to such financial matters of the Appellee 
failing to pay the $1,600.00 monthly mortgage amount for all this time, or even the 
$5,000.00 that the Appellant was awarded as part of the Supplemental Decree, but has 
never been paid by the Appellee. 
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October 2005 to October 2007 = 25 months @ $1,600.00 per month or about $40,000.00 or 
more, that the Appellee owed had she complied with the many court orders that directed she was 
to make the monthly mortgage payments on the parties' marital residence.) 
Therefore, had the District Court allowed hearing of the Appellant's issues, judgement 
would have been found in favor of the Appellant instead of the Appellee, not to mention other 
attributable factors that the District Court refused to consider like the following: 
a) The Total mortgage amounts or expenses attributable to the parties marital residence mortgage 
equals about $175,000.00 to avoid loosing the property to foreclosure that has been caused to 
have to be paid to the mortgage company because the Appellee failed pay the monthly mortgage 
amounts. Both the District Court (on three or more occasions), and then later this Utah Appeals 
Court (May 1, 2008 ruling) found that the Appellee was responsible for the mortgage payments 
on the parties' marital residence, but she refused to pay such mortgage payment. Thus, the 
Appellant was caused to suffer great expense and loss due to the Appellee's failure to pay the 
mortgage amounts, because the Appellant and the Appellee had entered into the mortgage 
contract during the course of their marriage, and each were personally financially liable and 
bound by the terms of said mortgage contract. However, the District Court three times ruled or 
acknowledged (Feb. 2006 transcript, March 2006 order, and again in the April 20, 2006 Order) 
that the Appellee Joanne Stone, was to pay the parties' $1,600.00 per month mortgage payment 
from August 3, 2005 until the property sold. At such time, the property had still not sold, and 
was being foreclosed upon, because of the Appellee's failure to pay the applicable monthly 
mortgage amount of $1,600.00 per month. When the Appellant sought to seek court enforcement 
or judgement against the Appellee for her failure to pay the $1,600.00 monthly court ordered 
mortgage payments, and or resulting expenses, the court refused to allow hearing on the issues, 
and further banned the Appellant from court, and thus this judgement that is currently being 
appealed was issued against the Appellant. 
b) The Appellant is entitled to seek modification of his child support amount given the unforeseen 
injury the Appellant suffered and resulting year of being out of work, and substantially lower 
wages available to earn. However, the District Court never allowed such hearing of facts or 
evidence. 
c) Appellant, upon finding the monthly amount of child support he was told had to be paid was far 
greater than what is found to be required if the opposing counsel had prepared the state's child 
support worksheet, the Appellant sought to have the child support assessment against him 
corrected, and the adult child removed from having to be paid for in his child support 
assessment, but still the District Court refused hearing or consideration of such matters. 
d) The Appellant found he was being unjustly denied the $5,000.00 yearly ($2,500.00 per year x 2 
children) Dependant child Tax deductions because the Appellee falsely claimed the Appellant 
was not entitled to them. The Appellant filed paperwork with the District Court to have the 
matter resolved, and such was denied proper hearing or consideration by the court. 
e) Items # 45 & 46 (page 17) of the parties' Supplemental Decree directs that Joanne Stone's 
Insurance policy is the primary insurance policy for the children's medical expenses, and then 
Todd's insurance plan is able to be used in addition for the medical expenses of the children. As 
such, Todd Stone is not required to pay medical bill amounts until after it is determined that 
amounts are due AFTER BOTH insurance companies have paid their respective amounts due. 
However, Joanne Stone never has made full disclosure of medical information or her policy 
benefits for Todd's insurance plan to determine their respective payment amount for the 
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children's medical bills. Thus, had Joanne Stone submitted and disclosed all pertinent 
information regarding the medical bills of the children, and benefits they already had received, 
then the Appellant would not have had to pay the medical bill amounts this order is a judgement 
of, because his insurance policy would pay the remaining amount of medical expense for the 
children. However, the District Court never allowed hearing of fact or evidence about the 
Appellant's claims, or issues needing to be considered along with those of the Appellee's. 
f) Additionally, Item # 45 of the parties' Supplemental Decree states with specificity that Appellee 
SHALL maintain health insurance coverage on the children. However, the court refused to allow 
any consideration of the Appellant's issue that the Appellee Joanne Stone voluntarily gave up her 
medical insurance coverage on the children for at least 7 months, and never disclosed exactly 
when she obtained such medical insurance for the children for that period of time or otherwise. 
Thus, the Appellant should not be caused to suffer expense or judgement against him because of 
the actions of the Appellee, nor, should the Appellee be allowed to escape accountability for her 
willful actions of non-compliance to orders of the court. 
g) Item # 45 of the parties' Supplemental Decree states with specificity the Appellant is required to 
pay Vi of the pro rated share of the insurance coverage for the minor children. Thus, the 
Medical Insurance amount the Appellant should be responsible for is around $40.00 per month as 
the Vi cost of the pro rated share of the insurance coverage for the minor children less any 
amount of coverage expense for the now adult child in the home, not the 90.00 per month that 
was assessed as judgement against the Appellant. See Exhibit # , a financial listing or 
worksheet, that was submitted to the District court and they refused to accept it or considered by 
the District Court. 
Applicable Facts in support of the Arguments listed above and applicable relief sought: 
1. Under the statute of Fraud, a party has the right to rescind, or modify a stipulated 
agreement any time up until the Judge signs the Order (January 9, 2006) if it is found out 
Fraud, Deception, or unforeseeable events occurred, and even afterwards when the fraud 
or deception is found out). 
2. As per the February 8, 2006 hearing transcript where she admits to representing in August 
2005 that she would continue to make the mortgage payments on the parties' marital 
home, but yet had not followed through with what she represented in August 2005 that 
she would do. Joanne represented as an act of Fraud or Deception, Enticement, or failure 
to disclose pertinent and applicable facts in order to get Judge Medley and the Appellant 
to act or agree differently (or accept the agreement, or rule differently) than they would 
have, if her intentions or actual conduct were known, and her unwillingness to be bound 
by the Supplemental Decree. Such Fraud, or failure to perform and represented she 
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would, is grounds to alter, dismiss, amend an order or agreement. And yet the Appellant 
was never allowed the opportunity to do so, or have such hearing of fact for such 
amendment or enforcement against the Appellee. Appellant held merit to bring his filings 
to be properly heard by the court, and still the District Court merely slapped him with a 
ban from having his issues heard by the court. Thus, then the Appellee was able to gain 
this October 2007 one sided judgment against the Appellant, and still escape 
accountability or consequence for her non compliance and her fraud or misrepresentation. 
3. Commissioner Casey, was not privy to the conversations of the Judge, and thus it is 
difficult for both Commissioner Casey, and the Appellant to know what or how the 
Appellant or the parties are to act or file, based on the comments of The District Court 
judge who said as noted in the August 3, 2005 transcript: 
a) "But at the same time I'm not going to cross that bridge if I'm required to 
cross it if, in fact, we have a problem". 
b) "it is hard to inject objectivity because of the nature of the relationships 
themselves". 
c) "I recognize we have an issue as to the sale of this property...which is totally 
impossible to resolve today. That's an issue that's going to have to be 
resolved ...(soon) (sic)." 
d) "then I will have to return at that point in time, if that arises, what impact it 
has on the settlement agreement", 
e) , "...I obviously can't force a stipulation on the parties. It is not something 
that I can do." 
4. As shown in the February 8, 2006 hearing transcript on pagel33, line # 7, the Appellee 
states on the record: "At the time it was negotiated (August 3, 2005) (Appellee) had no 
intention of moving, and was in the homefour plus year...", thus demonstrating or 
qualifying for the Appeals Court ruling of "taking or, or assuming that marital debt" 
provision of this Appeals Court May 1, 2008 ruling. 
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5. As shown in the August 3, 2005 hearing transcript, the Appellant only agreed to the 
following Appellee's stipulations of: 
a) "if the home is not sold then there is no agreement", and 
b) if counsel did not get the $35,000.00 from the sales proceeds then there was no 
agreement (Page 24 line #3), and 
c) "the agreement was premised on the fact that Annabelle Stone would agree 
to sell the properties (page 23, line # 10) and that if she does not sell the 
properties, then we don't have a settlement (line # 16), and 
d) I understand it can't be enforceable our agreement is 
contingent upon those properties being listed for sale and ...we 
don't have a deal if the properties are not listed by the time the 
final documents are prepared (page 13, line # 22), and, 
e) Most importantly, that the financial issues and custody issues not be separated. If 
the custody issue was separated from the financial issues, then the Appellant did 
not agree to the supplemental decree agreement as shown in hearing transcript on 
page 26, line # 3, when the specific question of separation of the two issues was 
proposed by the GAL. The financial issues to occur as the Appellee had 
represented they would occur, were a key issue for the parties to both have 
resources and pick up their own lives as they could if the properties were paid for 
as represented they would be paid for. But the Appellee failed to uphold her side 
of the equation, and just skipped town causing the Appellant to be financially 
burdened with what the Appellee had represented she would pay for. 
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6. As shown by the Appellant's following filings, the Appellant objected to the District Court 
from advancing only the Appellee's issues to hearing without first (or even without in 
addition to) hearing all of the facts and evidence of the financial issues relevant to the case, 
and relevant to the Appellee's contempt and failure to pay her financial obligations, that 
were applicable to the Appellee's attempt to gain the judgment she was seeking against 
the Appellant. Such was one sided justice against the Appellant and offered preferential 
consideration by the court toward the Appellee. None of the issues presented below in the 
Appellant's filings to the court were ever addressed by Judge Medley in his 12-12-05 
hearing or the 1-9-06 hearing, as the Transcripts show, but were "reserved" for later 
hearing. Then when the "later hearing on February 8, 2006 occurred with the 
Commissioner, the Commissioner merely assumed the issues were moot or had been taken 
care of earlier by Judge Medley and yet they had not been. That is why the Commissioner 
issued such $3,300.00 ban against the Appellant, but still the Appellant's Financial issues 
remain unresolved and unheard by the court. See what has been identified as 
Respondent's Amended Docketing Statement filed with this Brief rather 
than listing all such filings here: Because of the great number of related and 
documented filings applicable here and ease to refer to as reading this Brief. 
7. The District Court is bound to uphold the terms of a legally binding Mortgage contract 
against the Appellee, when entered into by the Appellee. Yet, the District Court tries to 
modify the terms or the parties of the mortgage contract, in error, and without jurisdiction 
over said contract. 
8. As a party to the mortgage contract the Appellee entered into, the Appellant holds 
standing to seek enforcement of the court's order the Appellee pay such mortgage 
payments. Yet the District Court erred in stating the Appellant did not hold standing in 
the action or matter of the foreclosure by the Mortgage company brought on by the 
Appellee's refusal to pay the court ordered mortgage payments on the parties' marital 
residence. 
In Support of the Arguments listed and Relief Sought: 
1. Appellant found out that the opposing counsel had not calculated the amount of monthly child 
support according to the State Calculation table. Had counsel prepared and submitted the 
required Child Support worksheet calculations, the court, and the Appellant would see that 
the assessed amount of child support was excessive against the Appellant given his wages. 
The Appellant would have only been assessed $400.00 per month of Child Support under the 
then current statutory child support guidelines, and then it would have been lower even still 
with the oldest child having graduated High School and Emancipated to an Adult. Instead, 
counsel wrote the Order to be $600.00 per month until the youngest child reaches 18, and 
even then is not shown to discontinue, even though he represented in August 3, 2005 hearing 
the statutory child support would be 200.00 per child, when in fact statutorily it was/is much 
lower. Then, prior to the Order of August 3, 2005 being signed by the court, the Appellant 
was caused to suffer a permanent disability in an unforeseen accident, and was unable to work 
for extended and lengthy period of time. Appellant filed motion to have the amount of child 
support adjusted to be in line with his then current wage and statutory guideline and such was 
never allowed proper hearing (see February 8, 2006 hearing transcript and subsequent filings 
of the Respondent). 
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2. Appellant was permanently injured in an industrial accident that would qualify to have child 
support lowered. 
3. Appellant seeks adjustment of the excessive amount of child support assessed against him 
Nunc pro Tunc to the date such was filed with the court in Late 2005, and thus the amount of 
judgement this appeals as child support amount would thereby be reduced. 
4. Appellee never provided the court, or the Appellant full disclosure of the medical conditions 
of the minor children. Thus, the Appellant's medical insurance was not apprised of the full 
need or diagnosis of the medical needs of the minor children on it's medical insurance 
coverage, or the benefits or insurance provisions of the California State plan or the 
Petitioner's plan, and as such denied payment of medical claims. The parties' Supplemental 
Decree states the parties are each allowed to submit the medical expenses to their respective 
insurance companies before they are required to pay the medical expense. However, full 
disclosure of the children's medical benefits or coverage, or conditions were never made by 
the Appellee, and as such the Appellant was unable to obtain payment of medical expenses for 
the children's medical bills from his insurance coverage. 
5. Appellant was assessed medical expenses for the oldest child that was undergoing cancer 
treatments that such medical expenses were covered by the State of California, and also being 
sought by Appellee to be paid by the Appellant. This "double Dipping" action of the Appellee 
should not be rewarded by the court. See exhibit # that shows medical expenses of 
Brittney, but were assessed against the Appellant in error as expense he was to pay. 
The Arguments are ripe for determination as to what paperwork is to be filed during the time 
frame of August 3, 2005 to January 9, 2006 and properly considered by the court given the facts 
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of the case, and the fact that the Judge said he would "fix" things if they did not go as planned. 
How long must the Appellant have to wait before the District Court Judge acts on the problems 
he said he would correct if he was required to do so (see Aug. 3, 2005 transcript noted above)? 
Appellant filed many objections to the court advancing issues to hearing and ruling WITHOUT 
having first allowed hearing of the facts and evidence pertaining to ALL of the Appellant's filed 
and applicable issues, such as the following In addition to the complete listing contained in the 
Respondent's Amended Docketing Statement included with this Brief: 
December 11, 2006, Motion for emergency hearing & Petition to lower child support 
amount. 
Request for medical information to be made available for submission to Respondent's 
insurance company, since decree states both parties insurance companies are to 
have bills prior to any party being forced to pay Transcript 18, line #15. 
August 7, 2007 Motion to strike Sept. 10, 2007 hearing. 
August 16, 2007 Notice of Lodging of Pertinent Facts 
August 17, 2007 filing " Objections to August 27th hearing. 
August 27, 2007 Motion to Strike Sept. 10th hearing. 
August 31, 2007 Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree. 
And other filings for the court to have considered but never were. 
Additionally, October 9, 2007 Respondent filed objection to the proposed Order and requested 
hearing of the facts and issues pertaining to all payments the Respondent had been caused to make 
because of the Petitioner's actions or conduct. The District Court never allowed or held the 
requested hearing. Thus the Appellant's issues to offset the amounts due the Petitioner were 
never properly considered by the court. 
This court is also asked to consider, that on her on volition, and without good cause, the Appellee 
voluntarily elected to give up medical insurance coverage for the child being treated for cancer, 
and the other child who has a heart condition, and still quit her good job here in Utah, and move 
to California where she did not have a house, a job, or medical insurance coverage for the 
children, all so that the children would be taken away from the Appellant as the only way to hurt 
him, and then used his financially strained position (his financial inability to pay the airfare that the 
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Appellee was to have paid for the children's travel related costs) as a means to keep the children 
away from him for almost three years. All the while, she would state in letters to the Appellant "if 
Annabelle Stone pays for the children's travel expenses, you can have visitation with them", and 
yet it was the Appellee Joanne Stone that moved away, causing the great travel expenses to have 
to be incurred in the first place. Annabelle Stone is NOT a party to this divorce action, and is 
NOT required to pay the children's' travel expenses, or required to pay the contracted mortgage 
obligations of Joanne Stone. The Petitioner Joanne Stone is required to pay the travel related 
expenses of, or for, the children's visitation with their Father here in Utah. 
Additionally, the Trial Court is in error to think or act that they hold authority to alter, modify, 
ignore, and even disregard, the terms or the parties to a legally binding mortgage contract. Thus, 
Joanne Stone should not have been released from her financial liability to pay the mortgage 
obligations on the parties' marital home, as was later upheld the ruling of this Utah Appeals Court 
ruling of May 1, 2008 that stated, and affirmed on top of page 3, but that the District Court 
refuses to uphold or enforce: 
... in this matter or in the past proceedings for protective orders" when read in unison, 
it is clear that final obligations for any debts, bills, or other costs incurred during the course of 
the divorce proceedings, unless expressly stated otherwise, were to be borne by the party that 
was previously ordered to resolve that debt or had otherwise taken on that obligation ". (NOTE: 
not just existing at time of settlement, but incurred during the course of the marriage) 
State Statute 30-3-5ci specifically directs that: 
The court SHALL INCLUDE the following in every Divorce Decree:, 
An order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or 
liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage. 
THEREFORE, THE Divorce decree of 2003, and the Supplemental DECREE ENTERED BY 
THE COURT on January 9, 2006 BOTH FAIL TO CONFORM TO, AND ARE 
IN VIOLATION OF, STATE STATUTE. Neither Order of the Court (Bifurcated 
Decree, or Supplemental Decree) contains specific order as to what divorcing 
party is responsible for payment of what joint marital debt obligation. 
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February 8, 2006 hearing transcript shows the court specifically recognized the Supplemental 
Decree DID NOT expressly state or specify or address what party was responsible for payment of 
the parties' marital residence mortgages. ( see page 134, Line # 14-16, & page 135, line # 14) 
Thus, under the Appeals Court Ruling noted above, AS WELL AS THE EFFECTIVE 
PRIOR (STANDING) ORDERS OF THE District Court; and the District Court's 
subsequent Orders of February 2006, March 2006, April 2006; Joanne Stone is still 
financially responsible for such mortgage payments as specified and further supported in other 
court rulings noted below. 
Joanne Stone was previously ordered to take on and pay the mortgages on the parties' marital 
home: June 21, 2001 Protective Order granting right of occupancy of marital residence to Joanne. 
July 25, 2001 Order specifying Both parties are to do their best efforts to preserve the 
equity in the marital residence. NOTE: Todd Stone has done everything in his 
power to preserve the equity of the properties from being taken by the financial 
institutions or foreclosed on, and yet the court has failed to recognize that his best 
efforts to preserve the equity of the marital residence was the order of the court. 
July 25, 2001 Order specifying Joanne Stone to pay both mortgages affiliated with the 
parties Marital home. Joanne was never granted ownership only occupancy right, 
and ordered to pay the mortgages because of her receipt of alimony & child 
support based on her making such payments and Todd's equal financial obligation 
to other joint marital liabilities that were assigned to him. 
July 25, 2001 Order specifying Joanne Stone to pay both mortgages affiliated with the 
parties Marital home. Joanne was never granted ownership only occupancy 
August 28, 2004 Order on Petitioner's Motion to move & sell the house. Order directed 
that if Petitioner moved to California, "it would be appropriate to review the 
issues of child support" & "If the Petitioner moves to California, the parties will 
need to determine how the mortgage will be paid.. .The marital residence shall not 
be sold". However, the District Court never allowed the Respondent to have 
hearing on how the mortgage was to be paid or the change in child support 
after the Petitioner moved to California, and such was not EXPRESSLY 
STATED in the Supplemental Decree. 
February 8, 2006 court hearing transcript Joanne Stone represented to the court that she 
was to have paid the two different mortgages on the parties' marital home. Page 
133, Line # 11-13 shows this representation to the court: "So at that time 
(August 3, 2005 hearing) she was assuming she would continue to make all the 
mortgage payments on that residence... That's Right". 
March 7, 2006 ruling of the court that Joanne Stone was to continue maintaining (paying) 
both mortgages on the parties' marital home. 
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The following apply to document #'s 2024 through 2033 that was the order of the court signed by 
the court on April 20, 2006, and yet the Appellant was never allowed by the court to have hearing 
on enforcement of the issues when the Petitioner failed to comply with the order of the court. 
Item # 3, directs that the Respondent was ordered to have free and unfettered access to the 
therapists (Plural) for the children, and such releases should be signed and 
submitted by the Petitioner to facilitate such access for the Respondent. 
HOWEVER, when the Petitioner failed to so comply, the court never allowed 
hearing on the issue or to enforce the order of the court against the Petitioner for 
her willful refusal to comply with this provision of the order of the court. Because 
the Respondent was denied access to involvement with the children's therapists, 
the children's' relationship has been caused to be fractured. To this date, the one 
child's therapist still has refused to communicate any issue about the child with the 
Respondent. Additionally, it was not until February 2007 that the Respondent was 
finally allowed some limited access to the therapist for another of the children. 
This long delay, and tumultuous relationship with the therapists also caused the 
children's relationships with their father to suffer irreparable harm and damage. 
Item # 5, Respondent was ordered to pay $33.00 for extra copy costs but was never 
allowed the opportunity to provide the extra copies to the court. The 
Commissioner only asked counsel to give him these copies. Later, it was found 
that the courtesy copies originally provided by the Respondent were filed in the file 
along with the originals or file copies. Assessment of copy costs is not appropriate 
against the Appellant, but never did the court allow the issue to be heard or offset 
against costs the Petitioner owed the Respondent for her failure to comply with 
statute or orders of the court. 
Item # 7, page 3 of the Petitioner's Order on Respondent's Motions (Exhibit # 1) 
"...Claims for relief relating to the custody evaluation are moot based 
on the stipulation of settlement (August 1, 2005 date) of the parties". 
NOTE: The District Court is in error in this point, because of the 
subsequent dates later in August 2005, when Joanne Stone used joint funds 
to pay her individual portion of the custody Evaluation (see Exhibit # 2 
showing dates later than the August 1, 2005 date assumed by the court as 
the settlement date. Such action by Joanne Stone, and failure to disclose 
the facts or return the funds that were not used, is fraud on the part of 
Joanne Stone. 
Item # 8, page 3 of the Petitioner's Order on Respondent's Motions (Exhibit # 1) 
Respondent's claim against Petitioner for unlawful termination of 
Respondent's Gas Utility service was dismissed in error because such has 
nothing to do with ownership or title of the home in Protective Order 
matters. The act of Joanne Stone terminating the Gas Service should not 
be dismissed just because of how the title of the property is held. 
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Item # 9, page 3 of the Petitioner's Order on Respondent's Motions (Exhibit # 1) 
" though the Respondent may be entitled to some sort of relief or 
credit for individual debts of the Petitioner that Respondent is required 
topay". NOTE: The District Court has NEVER ALLOWED 
HEARING OF THE evidence of the Petitioner's debts the Respondent 
is/ was required to pay, even though such is ordered by the court to 
occur. 
Item #10, page 4 of the Petitioner's Order on Respondent's Motions (Exhibit # 1) 
"...Any evidentiary hearing with respect to these limited issues 
(discussedpreviously in this section) should coincide with a hearing on 
scheduled transportation for Respondent's parent time, 
NOTE: THE COURT NEVER ALLOWED HEARING OF THE 
TRANSPORTA TION (including costs to either party) OR PARENT 
TIME ISSUES WHEN THEY HELD THE OTHER NOTED 
HEARING OF Petitioner's disparagement of Respondent & failure of 
therapy matters on October 19, 2007 before Judge Medley, as the Order 
from that date shows. 
Item #11 , page 4 of the Petitioner's Order on Respondent's Motions (Exhibit #1) 
Regarding the foreclosure against the parties marital residence due to 
Petitioner's failure to pay applicable mortgages on such residence, 
"... there may very well be some accounting that needs to occur with 
respect to the proceeds of the sale of the real properties. 
NOTE: this specifically contradicts the August 3, 2005 hearing, when on 
page 21, line # 21, the record of the court states: "What if the sale of the 
property and they take their money and there's not enough money to 
resolve the indebtedness I think and again on page 22, line # 5of that 
transcript, shows the funds were to be placed in the court until the claims 
of Annabelle Stone were settled. Anticipating the Petitioner would 
continue paying the mortgages on the parties' residence until it was sold. 
Item # 12, page 4 of the Petitioner's Order on Respondent's Motions (Exhibit #1) 
relating to the Wells Fargo Mortgage, on the marital residence, "...there 
may be the need for an accounting for proceeds between the parties 
herein based on the stipulation of the parties and the Supplemental 
Decree (including credits of offsetting amounts for amounts due the 
other party based on their financial obligation to the other party). 
Item #13, page 5 of the Petitioner's Order on Respondent's Motions (Exhibit # 1) 
relating to the "Respondent's motion for assignment of America First 
Debt Obligation deals with a debt that is not specifically addressed in the 
Supplemental Decree. It appears that Petitioner is responsible for 
maintaining this debt."... " Respondent may have claim against the 
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Petitioner to the extent that the Petitioner may have failed to maintain 
payments on either mortgage". NOTE: The District Court has NEVER 
ALLOWED HEARING OF THE evidence of the Petitioner's failure 
to pay her debts, even though such is ordered by the court to occur. 
Item # 14, page 5 of the Petitioner's Order on Respondent's Motions (Exhibit # 1) 
"...Respondent is not precluded from seeking to recover property that he 
can clearly establish is in the possession of the Petitioner". 
Item # 15, page 5 of the Petitioner's Order on Respondent's Motions (Exhibit # 1) 
"... Respondent is not precluded from seeking modification (of child 
support, Tax Advantages, Return of Funds J provided he can, in good 
faith, allege a substantial change of circumstances" NOTE: The 
District Court has NEVER ALLOWED HEARING OF THE evidence 
of the Respondent's change of circumstances affecting his ability to 
pay, or his wage accountable for child support calculations, even 
though such is ordered by the court to occur. 
Item # 16, page 5 of the Petitioner's Order on Respondent's Motions (Exhibit # 1) 
"... The sole exception is any claim that may exist with respect to the 
nonpayment of debts and obligations on the marital residence until it is 
ascertained whether there are any proceeds to be divided". 
Item # 23, page 7 of the Petitioner's Order on Respondent's Motions (Exhibit # 2) 
"... If the Petitioner, going forward, fails to comply with provisions of 
the Supplemental Decree, Respondent can seek appropriate enforcement 
and relief". 
Item # 27, page 7 of the Petitioner's Order on Respondent's Motions (Exhibit # 2) 
"... If Respondent can establish that he has expended personal funds to 
repair the residence, after the residence is sold, he may have a claim as 
to the proceeds. (See Exhibit #3 documenting Petitioner's attempt to 
sell the residence). 
Item # 28, page 8 of the Petitioner's Order on Respondent's Motions (Exhibit # 4) 
"... Court granted Respondent's previously filed motion for it to 
consider his previously filed motions, and then failed to allow hearing 
on them, or presentation of evidence on the prior motions pertaining to 
child support, or assignment of marital debts, visitation times of 
November 2005 & December 2005 and conflicting state statues that 
apply, and related travel costs. Because during those times, the valid 
and standing order of the court would have directed the children might 
visit with their mom, because they would have resided with their father. 
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Additionally, visitation would have been every week or other week, not 
once in the entire period. Or none at all as it had been for 3 years or more. 
Item #30, page 8 of the Petitioner's Order on Respondent's Motions (Exhibit # 4) 
"... Respondent must pay the fees and costs ordered by the 
Commissioner, once that amount has been determined, and must supply 
proof of such payment to the court, before Respondent may notice 
additional matters for hearing". 
To Date, the Appellee has never had to face accountability for her violation of the above shown 
Court Order. The Appellant has never been allowed enforcement of the above noted Court Order 
To Date, The Appellee has never had to face accountability for her reckless acts of abandoning 
the parties' marital home or failing to continue making the applicable mortgage payments that she 
was ordered by the court to pay. The Appellee has never had to be accountable for any of her 
actions or contracted obligations. 
The Appellant has paid his financial obligations the best he has been able; given the limited 
resources he has had, including his having to pay the parties' two other joint marital debt 
mortgages. Thus, the Appellee was assigned less than Vi of the parties' joint marital debt when 
the court ordered her to pay both the Wells Fargo mortgage and the America First mortgage. 
The Appellee just abandoned the parties marital home, and refused to pay any of it's mortgage 
obligations. 
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Commissioner Casey has denied the Respondent his right to equal application of the law under the 
Many Utah Cases where the court has already ruled on the word "shall" but yet still the Trial 
Court failed to uphold such rulings in this case. 
If the Appellee demonstrated that she did not want any interest in maintaining the marital home, 
or its mortgages, then the Appellee should not be afforded any interest or portion of that asset. 
The Appellee did so by abandoning the residence and refusing to make any mortgage payments 
even though she had the financial means to continue paying the mortgage payments, she 
voluntarily elected not to pay the bills and mortgages she was ordered to pay. 
The Appellee has never paid her attorney fees that she owes that exceed $200,000.00 
In a COURT OF EQUITY, this court is asked to consider the fact that: IF THE APPELLEE had 
had to pay for her ($200,000 00 +) ongoing legal representation that she asked to have represent 
her, and agreed to pay, as most litigants have to, as well as paying all of her financial 
responsibilities as the court has ordered her to pay, or as she individually contracted to do, as well 
as had to pay full income taxes as well as was unable to fraudulently obtain Medicare funding for 
medical expenses she was responsible for, Housing, mortgage, and utility expenses, and many 
other expenses that have or would arise through these long protracted divorce proceedings 
continued, the Appellee would have had the similar financial hardship as the Appellant has had to 
face, and thus, the Appellee would have been motivated to act differently than she did so act. 
Appellee's Failure to Reside in, and Failure to Maintain Mort2age Payments Resulted in 
Additional Amounts Due and must be allowed to be considered by the court 
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As a part of the Mortgage payments on the marital residence, the property taxes, and the 
homeowners insurance policies were paid from escrow of that mongage payment of $1,600 00 
per month Thus, Property Taxes, and Homeowners insurance costs are also considered to be 
maintained until the property is sold since they were parts of the Mortgage Payments the Appellee 
was ordered to maintain The additional legal or collection fees that were charged the Appellant 
because the Appellee failed to pay the court ordered mortgages are also to be assessed against the 
A-ppellee as a result of her actions and willful disregard to comply with the court orders for her to 
pay such mortgages The Mortgage interest Rates were higher than the statutory Post 
Judgement interest rate is now, so as not to allow the Appellee greater financial benefit or 
advantage for failing to comply with the many court orders, the Appellee should also pay the 
higher interest rate Additionally, the Appellee (Petitioner) has failed to pay the mortgage 
payments of $1,600 00 per month since November 2005 Just because the Mortgage amounts 
have been suspended, does not mean the Property Taxes, and homeowners insurance costs that 
were included as part of the mortgage payments the Appellee was ordered to maintain, still 
continue on the property until it is sold Because the actions of the Appellee (Petitioner) of failing 
to "maintain" or pay the court ordered mortgage payments, thus causing the Mortgage 
Companies to accelerate their loans, and commence foreclosure action against Todd Stone & 
Joanne Stone, the Appellee (Petitioner) should be financially liable for the entire loan amounts that 
were accelerated for payment to the Mortgage Companies, (approximately $175,000 00 or more) 
Thus, the amount of money the Appellee (Petitioner) should pay the Appellant (Respondent), 
because of her failure to "maintain" both mortgages, far exceeds the $3,700 00 amount that the 
court uses to bar the Appellant from court Along with ongoing property taxes and homeowner's 
insurance premiums due on the Melony Drive property, utility expenses are required to maintain 
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the properties' value like water & power for the automatic sprinkling of the outside landscaping,, 
and heat to keep the pipes from freezing and power for security features, since the house has been 
vacated and abandoned by the Appellee. 
America First Credit Union Loan Not Being Paid by Appellee 
Before Commissioner Casey had ruled that the $3,300.00 attorney fee and copy cost had to be 
paid before any new matter could be heard, Commissioner Casey ruled that any "new" item or 
"post decree" issue or Decree enforcement matter that arose or occurred after the August 1, 2005 
hearing, could be presented to the court. ( See Exhibit # , Document # 2207). As Exhibit 
# (November 23, 2005 letter from Brent Chipman to Mary Corporon, "post decree") 
shows, the Appellee agrees to pay the America First Credit Union Loan, but then in 2006, she 
stops paying on that loan, causing the property to be taken over by the lender, and go into 
foreclosure. So when the Appellant presented this "new" issue to Commissioner Casey in early 
2006, Commissioner Casey acted contrary to his ruling on "new" or "enforcement", and still 
refused to allow hearing of the evidence or facts, even BEFORE there was any attorney fee 
assessment against the Appellant to block his right to court intervention. The same denial of the 
Appellant's right to seek court intervention on other similar "new" matters that arose on 3/15/06 
with a "Notice of default and election to sell" filed by Lundberg Trustee trying to take the marital 
property, or the January 30, 2007 Substitution of Trustee filed by Timothy W. Blackburn, and 
many other "new" matters or filings. Commissioner Casey seems to be of the opinion to just sit 
back and let everyone take what they want and then there will not be anything left to hear or rule 
on. That is NOT in compliance with the rules directing Judicial Economy or allowing one to seek 
timely redress in the courts. State Statute as well as the court has made directives similar to that 
ruled in Finlayson, where Justice Russell Bench said: 
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"... the trial court may not determine or influence the enforceability or un-enforceability of a 
marital debt in a divorce proceeding". Without allowing hearing of the mortgage payment 
issues, Commissioner Casey is inappropriately influencing the enforceability and or un-
enforceability of the marital debt issue only against Todd Stone, and NOT Against Joanne 
Stone, or itfs credit repercussions. 
Appellant Was Denied His Right to Enforcement of Court Orders 
The Appellant tried to seek court intervention and enforcement of the "Post Decree" or " new" 
items presented below, but was continually rejected by the court. The Appellant attempted to 
bring the Financial issues to the court for enforcement of "post" decree orders, because two . 
separate "Post Decree" orders so direct that the Appellant has the right to do so, because the 
Appellee (Petitioner identified in the orders) failed to comply with such orders of the court. 
The District Court has denied every attempt the Appellant has made, to show the court what 
amounts the Appellant has had to pay because of the actions of the Appellee. Thus, without 
allowing proper or full hearing of fact or evidence, the Court is not fully aware of the actions of 
the Appellee. 
Wells Fargo Mortgage & America First Credit Union Loans Not Being Paid by Appellee as 
the court had ordered them to be paid by Appellee 
Before Commissioner Casey had ruled that the $3,300.00 attorney fee and copy cost had to be 
paid before any new matter could be heard, Commissioner Casey ruled that any "new" item or 
"post decree" issue or Decree enforcement matter that arose or occurred after the August 1, 2005 
hearing, could be presented to the court. ( See Exhibit # , Document # 2207). As Exhibit 
# (November 23, 2005 letter from Brent Chipman to Mary Corporon, "post decree") 
shows, the Appellee agrees to pay the America First Credit Union Loan, but then in 2006, she 
stops paying on that loan, causing the property to be taken over by the lender, and go into 
foreclosure. So when the Appellant presented this "new" issue to Commissioner Casey in early 
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2006, Commissioner Casey acted contrary to his ruling on "new" or "enforcement", and still 
refused to allow hearing of the evidence or facts, even BEFORE there was any attorney fee 
assessment against the Appellant to block his right to court intervention. The same denial of the 
Appellant's right to seek court intervention on other similar "new" matters that arose on 3/15/06 
with a "Notice of default and election to sell" filed by Lundberg Trustee trying to take the marital 
property, or the January 30, 2007 Substitution of Trustee filed by Timothy W. Blackburn, and 
many other "new" matters or filings. Commissioner Casey seems to be of the opinion to just sit 
back and let everyone take what they want and then there will not be anything left to hear or rule 
on. That is NOT in compliance with the rules directing Judicial Economy or allowing one to seek 
timely redress in the courts. State Statute as well as the court has made directives similar to that 
ruled in Finlayson, where Justice Russell Bench said: 
"... the trial court may not determine or influence the enforceability or un-enforceability of a 
marital debt in a divorce proceeding'9. Without allowing hearing of the mortgage payment 
issues, Commissioner Casey is inappropriately influencing the enforceability and or un-
enforceability of the marital debt issue only against Todd Stone, and NOT Against Joanne 
Stone, or it's credit repercussions. 
Water Damage & Insurance proceeds 
Another "new" issue, that arose after the August 1, 2005 date Commissioner Casey ruled were 
admissible as "post decree" but that Commissioner Casey refused to allow into court even long 
before the "Attorney Fee ban", was the fact that Joanne Stone received funds for repairs to the 
Melony Drive property from the JOINT homeowners policy held in the names of Todd Stone & 
Joanne Stone, as shown by the check copies as Exhibit # , (and that were presented to 
the court numerous times for consideration). After Joanne Stone abandoned the Melony Drive 
Property, the Appellant entered by legal means, and surveyed the property. The Appellant found 
the water damage and the carpet damage had NOT been repaired as the Appellant had taken the 
insurance funds to do so. Pictures of the water, and Carpet and Roof damage, were submitted to 
the court. However, Commissioner Casey refused to hear any evidence of this matter stating 
Todd Stone held a claim in the future for such misused funds and damage repair. Therefore, 
Appellant retained his liens on the Appellee's property interests, to protect Appellant's right to 
claim of funds, otherwise would not be available to the Appellant. Additionally, when the 
homeowners insurance was attempted to be renewed, the insurance company refused to issue a 
renewal of the policy until the previously paid for damages and claims were repaired. Thus, Todd 
Stone, nor Annabelle Stone could get insurance on the Melony Drive property. (Todd Stone 
holds an insurable interest, with the future distribution of sale proceeds to Todd Stone). 
However, when the Appellant presented evidence of "new" or "post Decree", or decree 
enforcement issues, such as those listed above, or of the Custody Evaluator returning joint marital 
funds back to the Appellee via Brent Chipman, after the August 3, 2005 hearing, or the Appellee 
taking joint funds out of the America First Credit union account AFTER August 1, 2005 for her 
own personal use, or when in October 2005, the Appellee took much of Lewis Stone's property 
with her to California, or May 2, 2006 when the law office of Smith Knowles was seeking action 
against Todd Stone because of the action of Joanne Stone, Commissioner Casey refused to allow 
any hearing of those matters, thus contradicting his prior agreement that "new" issues could be 
brought to the court for resolution. 
Contrary to Some Beliefs, Appellant IS NOT Responsible for the Lengthy Delay 
The Appellant has tried many times to point out the misunderstanding of the facts the court had 
been given to them, or was under the misperception of, and also to show that it was NOT the 
Appellant that was cause for the lengthy delay that has occurred. See Exhibit # , 
(Document #2125-2135) 
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As shown in Exhibit # , (Document # 2189), the Appellant had filed with Judge Medley's 
office a "Motion to Submit for Evidentiary Hearing for visitation issues and Petitioner's failure to 
pay mortgages and other actions of the Petitioner and counsel". By the Judges own response 
recorded on the sticky note attached directly to the file copy, a Scheduling hearing was to be 
scheduled, without limitation to only visitation issues, but included all of the issues presented in 
the Appellant's filed Motion for Evidentiary hearing. Without reason or notice, such was later 
unfairly modified and limited only to include visitation matters, and then the year long delay never 
included that the delayed hearing would never allow hearing of issues other than the visitation 
matters, like the financial matters, and the Appellee's contempt or failure to comply with the 
Financial orders of the court. 
Appellant's Multiple Requests for Hearing & Notice to Submit were ignored 
Even after Commissioner Casey "REITTERATED" he had certified the Appellant's visitation 
issues for trial, (See Commissioner Casey's August 24, 2006 ruling, document #2142, Item # 3), 
Judge Medley would STILL NOT schedule a hearing of the issues when the Appellant filed his 
Notice to submit for evidentiary hearing on September 27, 2006, (Document #2184) 
As per Exhibit # , (and many other filings noted here), even though the Appellant filed 
objections, (See Documents # 3305, 3362, 3372, 3523, 3525, 3693, 3837, 3853 and several more 
filings) requesting hearing on, or appeal of, Commissioner Casey's rulings or actions, no such 
hearing or opportunity to review was granted the Appellant, (see document # 3541 - 3545, 3434-
3436, 336-3371, 3303). Neither was the Appellant allowed to present correcting facts to the 
court. 
Judge Medley Refused to Accept or Reco2nize Commissioner's April 2006 Certification 
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As shown in Exhibit # , Document #3371, Commissioner Casey had already certified the 
issues for trial on April 18, 2006, but Judge Medley failed to honor or recognize such certification 
of issues for trial and yet when the issue was returned to the Commissioner for certification for 
trial, Commissioner Casey states "there was no purpose to re-certify issues he had already 
certified for trial", and therefore, a year and Vi long delay ensued, causing the issues certified for 
trial on April 18, 2006, NOT being heard until October 19, 2007. Such long delay in hearing the 
issues caused irreparable harm to the Appellant, and prejudiced the court in many different ways 
with the subsequent events that were allowed to occur in that 17 months until the evidentiary 
hearing was held on October 19, 2007. 
Court Error Caused More Delay & Prejudice against the Appellant due to rising bills 
As shown in Exhibit # , Document #3312, Judge Medley was mistaken when he thought 
there was NO MORE ISSUES REMAINING to be heard at trial that had previously been 
certified for trial when on March 29, 2007 he ordered the Appellants' Previously filed (March 16, 
2007 Notice to Submit for Trial), be struck. However, in fact the issues that Commissioner Casey 
had previously certified for trial on April 18, 2006, STILL REMAINED unheard at trial. 
This error of the court caused additional delay of hearing the visitation issues that eventually 
(after much delay) were heard by Judge Medley and ruled on in the October 19, 2007 hearing. It 
is further supported that Judge Medley contradicted himself thus causing unnecessary delay for 
the Appellant, in that Exhibit # (document # 2223-2224) Dated November 8, 2006, Judge 
Medley gives Notice of Evidentiary hearing of issues he noted was certified for trial April 20, 
2006. These two errors of Judge Medley is significant Court error, NOT Harmless error 
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because of the long delay, and resulting harm or prejudice against the Appellant that 
transpired and was placed upon the Appellant because of the excessive and unnecessary delays. 
Appellant was Unfairly Prejudiced in the Court by the Ongoing Delay 
Because the Trial Court took so long from April 18, 2006 (as per document #2142) to October 
2007, to hold hearing on the visitation issues and medical information issues of the children and 
the Appellant, the Appellant was denied his right to be with or care for his child while she lay in 
the hospital suffering from cancer. As a result of such, the child's relationship with their Father 
has suffered irreparable harm because she was led to believe her Father did not care about her, 
when it was the Appellee that instructed the doctors caring for the child, NOT to disclose any 
information to the Father, or to put his calls through to her room while she was in the hospital. 
This is not only something that harmed the Appellant and his relationship with his Daughter, it is 
also contrary to the court's requirement of action in the Best Interests of the children. The 
Appellant being able to also care for, or be with his sick & hospitalized child is in the best 
interests of the child as well, but was denied with the court taking 18 months to hear the visitation 
& parent time matters. 
Additionally, the Appellant was harmed and prejudiced in the courts because of the long delay in 
hearing of the issues: In April -June 2006, the Appellant was represented by counsel, but by 
October 2007, the Appellant could no longer afford legal representation, and was forced to 
represent himself in court and that in itself caused the court to act differently toward the unskilled 
representation by the Appellant. Thus, the Appellant was unjustly prejudiced in the whole process 
or filings and court hearings because of the extensive delay from the time the issues were first 
certified for trial in June 2006, and hearing date of October 19, 2007. 
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This unnecessary delay in hearing of the certified issues at trial, caused several other prejudices 
and irreparable problems for both the Appellant and the children. Around December 2006, the 
parties' oldest daughter was diagnosed with Cancer, and thus caused further delay, that should 
not have been an issue if in July 2006 Judge Medley had recognized and accepted the issues were 
certified for trial in April 2006. Additionally, by October 2007, the Appellant's financial condition 
dramatically changed from June 2006 going forward, thus rendering him financially unable to pay 
for the children's travel expenses that the Appellee was to pay for, or other bills because the 
Appellant had faced so many other expenses he had to pay because of the Appellee's misconduct 
and refusal to pay her court ordered mortgage payments and penalties and interest charges. 
If the Petitioner had paid the debts she was ordered to pay or had not stolen all the funds that she 
has from the Respondent, the Respondent would have far more funds than the $3,300.00 amount 
of attorney fee assessment, but the court refuses to consider the evidence or the facts. The Court 
had violated the Respondent's right to seeking justice and enforcement of the Court's Orders. 
As Exhibit # (docketed document # 3541 to 3545) shows, the Appellant filed motion for an 
expedited hearing on August 1, 2007, so the Appellant could still have time for visitation with the 
children for Summer visitation while they were still out of school. Under the Relocation Statute 
30-3-37, the Appellant was entitled to the right for an expedited hearing of the visitation issues, 
yet the Trial court denied the Appellant such right until after the children's Summer 2007 
Vacation was over. Because the Trial Court delayed hearing the previously certified issues of 
from April 18, 2006 (as per document # 2142), the Appellant was caused to be denied the 
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opportunity to have Summer 2006, Fall 2006 Christmas 2006, Easter 2007, and Summer 2007 
Visitation with the children. 
The Appellant was denied an expedited hearing of the visitation issues as afforded under section 
30-3-37 as the relocation statute when requested such expedited hearing of the visitation matters, 
by the Trial Court mistakenly thinking the Relocation statute does not apply, However, over a 
year later, Commissioner Casey in his September 6 2007 minute entry on page 3, recognizes the 
Appellant is entitled to enforcement and application of the Relocation statutes of 30-3-37 
expedited hearing, but even then, STILL DENIED THE APPELLANT AN EXPEDITED 
HEARING. (See document # 3749 Exhibit # ). Consequently, the Appellant was unfairly 
and unjustly denied an expedited hearing of the visitation issues for over 18 months, (from April 
18, 2006 (as per document # 2142), to October 19, 2007) when finally the visitation issues were 
allowed to be heard). Commissioner Casey's court error in failing to honor the Appellant's right 
to an expedited trial caused the children to be denied their visitation and the Father Daughter 
relationship to be fractured. 
In the October 19, 2007 hearing before Judge Medley, Judge Medley failed to address the issue 
that Commissioner Casey had stated the Appellant was entitled to Thanksgiving 2005 Visitation 
with the children under the Relocation Statute. Additionally, Commissioner Casey recognized 
Appellee's letter to the Appellant and representations to the court that the Appellant was NOT 
going to have Thanksgiving 2005 visitation with the children was an denial of the statutory and 
decreed visitation for the Appellant. At Thanksgiving 2005, the Appellant was not delinquent on 
child support amounts to the Appellee, and thus the Appellee was to have paid the entire travel 
costs for the children but refused to allow such visitation for the children. As Commissioner 
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Casey stated in his ruling, ".. the shifting Thanksgiving holiday under the guidelines is not an 
excuse for the Petitioner's insistence that the respondent exercise his parent time ...at some 
other time" Such later time in the future proved to be more advantageous for the Appellee, and 
more prejudicial against the Appellant. See Exhibit # a November 18, 2005 letter from 
Brent Chipman to Mary Corporon, where Brent Chipman intentionally and maliciously 
misrepresented the time the Appellant took for the prior year's visitation as ten (10) days extra 
visitation, when it was only one (1) day extra visitation the children had with the Appellant from 
what is statutorily allowed the Appellant. The District Court is charged with having to rule under 
the requirements or rights afforded by State Statute, as found under Brixen, where the court held 
"...the courts do not have the power to re-write statutes, and must rule under the plain 
language used in the statute. " However, if the District Court refuses to allow hearing on the 
issue, how can the Respondent seek adjudication by the court under the plain language used in 
State Statute. 
a) Section (5)(a) (i) of that code section states that "in years ending in an ODD 
number, the child SHALL SPEND ...Thanksgiving holiday with the non-
custodial parent' (paraphrased). The year 2005 was an odd #'rd year, and thus 
such provision applies to the Respondent. However, the Petitioner elected to act 
against the law in contempt, and not provide for the children to spend their 2005 
Thanksgiving Holiday with the Respondent. Thus further demonstrating 
Commissioner Casey's denial of justice for the Respondent by refusing to allow 
hearing and holding the visitation issue hostage. 
b) Section (5)(b)(ii) of that section states that "in years ending in an EVEN 
number, the child SHALL SPEND ...Spring Break with the non-custodial 
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parent" (paraphrased). Thus, the Respondent was entitled to the children's 2006 
Spring Break parent time visitation. Again, the Petitioner failed to comply with 
the law, and prevented the children from having their Spring Break parent Time 
Visitation with the Respondent. Again, Commissioner Casey obstructed justice by 
denying the Respondent his right to seek recours against the Petitioner for her 
refusal to abide with State Statute. 
c) Section (7) of that section states that"... the relocating party SHALL BE 
RESPONSIBLE for all the child9s travel expenses relating to Subsection (5) (a) 
and (b)... 
Court Delay Caused Appellant's Child Support Arrearaee to Arise 
State Statute 3 0-3-3 3-(8) Specifically states "Neither parent time, nor child Support is to be 
withheld due to either parent}s failure to comply with a court ordered parent time schedule" 
Thus, the Appellant's outright refusal to facilitate and deliver the children to Utah as the decree so 
ordered, the children to visit their Father in Utah so directed, was a violation of this statute, even 
if the Appellee thought the Appellant was failing to comply with making child support payments 
because of his unemployment and injury. Initially, visitation was withheld by the Appellee 
because of the amount of attorney fees that was owing from the Appellant, and not child Support 
owing. 
The Appellant never withheld Child Support from the Appellee, even though he was not able to 
see his children, for almost three (3) years. Arrearage of child support only developed because he 
was unemployed at the time due to the industrial accident. Once he was medically cleared to 
return to work, employment was immediately obtained, and the Appellant continued to pay child 
support and the arrearage that had occurred because the District court had not allowed the child 
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support amount to be heard and reduced due to unforeseen injury and unemployment for 6 
months, and lowered due to the unforeseen industrial accident the Appellant was a victim of. 
As shown in Commissioner Casey's September 6, 2007 ruling (page 6, Docketed document # 
3752) Exhibit # shows that the Appellant was denied opportunity to address lowering of 
his child Support amount due the unforeseen industrial accident of September 2005 because the 
Appellant titled his filing "Motion to Modify" rather than "Petition to Modify". Because the 
Appellant presented the issue as a financial matter rather than a visitation matter, the issue was 
not allowed to be properly heard by the court in any of the hearings it was attempted to be 
presented. However, the payment (or lack there of) is a visitation matter as it relates to the 
Appellee paying the travel related costs for the children. Thus the Appellant was improperly 
denied proper hearing of the issue to lower his child support amount because of his inability to 
pay such high amount as he was disabled and out of work for a significant amount of time. 
Court & Appellee Fail to Act in the Best Interest of the Children 
Holding the other issues hostage until appealed attorney fees are paid is unconstitutional behavior 
of the District Court, and not in compliance with the higher standard of review as per T.B., where 
the UTAH court has previously ruled: 
"... in proceedings regarding the Best Interests of the children, the higher standard of proof of 
clear and convincing evidence is the standard of review, rather than merely a preponderance 
of the evidence". 
However, without allowing a hearing on the pending issues to take place, how can the court stick 
to the higher standard of review to determine what is in the Best Interests of the children 
Medically, emotionally, or financially. 
The Court's failure to review all the facts, and making assumptions without the facts presented 
and such type of against the Respondent is contrary to justice as found in the court's ruling in 
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T.B. that found uthat a judge made rule for judicial efficiency if applied would impinge on the 
best interests of a child is misapplied justice, and fits the narrow exception qualifying to 
raising the issues prior to appeal", as well as that "plain error is also demonstrated by the 
court when the court fails to meet the best interests of the child(ren). 
In a hearing on August 9, 2007, (see exhibit # , document # 3667), the Guardian ad litem 
expressed it was in the best interests of the children to have ALL the previously presented issues 
certified for trial. This is for several reasons, but notably are the fact that the children are told the 
Following: "they cannot so see their Dad, because Dad will not pay for if\ and also the 
children report to the GAL "they just want the whole thins to end\ and that they are told that 
"Dad keeps takins Mom back to court'. All of these comments told to the children are 
negatively affecting the Father-child relationship, and come from either the Appellee, or their 
Grandparents they reside with in California, or some other source they have frequently been 
exposed to. The Appellant has been prejudiced among his children because Commissioner Casey 
refuses to allow the Financial issues to be heard, and the case protracted for such a long period of 
time. Commissioner Casey's ruling also included this ruling, but still Commissioner Casey refused 
to act on the Best interests of the children to let the Appellant's issues be properly heard by the 
divorce court: "The GAL finds it appropriate and expeditious to have all the matters certified". 
Thus, it is determined that allowing the Appellant full access to present his issues and financial 
matters would not only be in the best interests of the children, but would also be most judicially 
expedient or expeditious to the court resources. However, the Trial Court failed to act on the 
Best Interests of the children by denying the Appellant the opportunity to present his 
financial matters. Thus, this matter has to drag on all this much farther in time, and have 
47 
problems with the children's relationship be fractured and strained even more, because they keep 
hearing at their home with their mother and older sister, that "Dad is still taking Mom to courty 
and they just want it over with", only benefits the Appellee, with her relationship with the 
children, and the children do not see that there are consequences for ones' actions. By continuing 
to prolong the financial issues of the Appellant from being heard, Commissioner Casey is unjustly, 
and unfairly protecting Joanne Stone from having to face her financial obligations or face the 
consequences of her actions, and face the financial devastation of electing to voluntarily abandon 
the Melony Drive property, and to stop making the monthly mortgage payments. 
Furthermore, the Woodward Court held that the court errs in basing a decision on a 
conclusion, rather than on the facts presented to them. 
Commissioner Casey's action of holding the other pending issues hostage is not in the children's 
Best Interests because the District court used their own assumptions without hearing of the facts, 
and they have refused to allow the facts and evidence to be made known to the court. Because of 
the misapplication of justice of holding the Respondent hostage for a debt that he can not pay 
because of the financially devastating position the Petitioner's actions have left the Respondent to 
face, and still the District Court feels that it is right to hold Annabelle Stone responsible to make 
all the needed payments that the Appellee Joanne Stone refuses to make, rather than to fix the 
problem they created by entering the order they did January 9, 2006. 
The Appellant does not have the great amount of wealth or funds the Trial Court has been mislead 
to believe he has. Additionally, because the Appellee has failed to seek action in other cases she is 
involved in to gain her sale proceeds of the property she holds ownership title to, is further 
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support for allowing these financial matters to advance in the court process without having to 
continue the denial of the Appellant to court until he pays an attorney assessment that he can not 
afford because of the financial strain the Appellee's actions have placed upon the Appellant. 
When the Commissioner Casey asked the Appellant to provide information as to why the 
Financial matters should be allowed to be heard and the Appellant was unable to pay the 
$3,300.00 additional costs after the Appellee's actions had already caused the Appellant to drain 
all of his financial resources available to him, in it's May 14, 2007 ruling, the Commissioner Casey 
refused to accept or consider the facts sworn to by the Appellant in his May 22, 2007 affidavit 
(document #3419, 3421-3425). Thus, the Commissioner without hearing of fact or evidence, 
merely rejected the truth because of his preconceived notion of Todd Stone, and held no regard 
for the shattered financial state Todd faces. 
Additionally, under Beltran, where Judge Judith Billings said "the purpose of statute, rule, 
should 2Qvern over the rigid form of a statute or rule when it obstructs the rights of fathers 
that want to be involved with their children, and assume parental responsibilities or parent 
rights". 
In accordance with Utah Code (UCA 30-3-10) the Trial Court is to act in the Best interests of the 
children in all of the court's decisions, and SHALL consider the past conduct and demonstrated 
actions of each parent. Based on the Appellee's failure to act in the best interests of the children 
when she even had the financial means to do so, qualify for the court to reverse custody from her 
to award custody to the Appellant. The Appellant has never acted contrary to the Best Interests 
of the children, considering his financial ability and his disability, of which should not be 
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considered to not award custody to the Appellant. By trying to save the parties marital home, the 
children have stronger financial security for their future, and their own home to return to, in the 
neighborhood they enjoyed and had friends in. In Contrast, the Appellee has only acted out of 
selfish interest to harm the Appellant at all cost by taking the children away when not even having 
a job or a house to go to in California or medical insurance coverage. Without full disclosure of 
all medical information, the Appellee can hide the fact that she failed to have Medical insurance 
coverage for the children that caused the Cancer to spread further in the child before it was able 
to be treated by the doctors once she obtained medical insurance coverage for the children as was 
she required to maintain coverage on the children since before August 3, 2005 hearing & 
stipulation. Furthermore, the Appellee acted contrary to the best interest of the children by 
not facilitating their frequent & meaningful visitation with their father as she held the 
financial and other means to do so, and yet still refused to transport the children to U?tah 
for their visitation with their Father. This is amid her appearance in text to be concerned for 
the children to have visitation, but her actions show otherwise, when she held about $30,000.00 in 
a bank account available for her personal use (See Exhibit # Document # ). 
Furthermore, the Appellee was employed at a job for a greater salary than she had in Utah, and far 
more than the Appellant's Salary AND she did not have to pay rent or housing or utility costs. 
(Appellee was living with her parents working full time at a wage equal to or greater than she 
received while here in Utah having to pay $1,600.00 per month as housing costs). 
In an effort of Judicial economy and for the best interests of the children, the Appellant should not 
be denied any longer his right to have the financial matters heard and ruled upon, and a final 
determination of this case achieved. See Commissioner Casey Ruling of Exhibit # 
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, document # that specifically addresses the need to continue the sanction against the 
Appellant is no longer needed given the lack of collection efforts by the Appellee, and the passage 
of time that has shown the Appellee's conduct is less than reputable as well. 
Furthermore, 30-3-10-(2) specifically states: the court SHALL consider: 
. ..which parent is MOST LIKELY to act in the best interests of the children) INCLUDING 
allowing the child FREQUENT AND CONTINUING CONTACT WITH THE NON-
CUSTODIAL PARENT" 
At all of the court proceedings between August 3, 2005, to the present time, the District Court 
has refused to comply with the mandated words of the above noted statute or receive hearing of 
fact or evidence of the Appellee's failure to act in the children's best interest, and failure to 
provide FREQUENT, & Continuing contact, or visitation for the children and their Father. No 
visit with the children for three years is NOT considered frequent, or meaningful or continuing 
visitation as statute directs visitation with the non custodial parent to be, or that either statute or 
guidelines allow the children to enjoy with their Father. The children have been harmed as well. 
Interlocutory Appeal Dismissed Incorrectly for Lack of Final Order 
Previously in this matter of the Appellant being blocked or banned from court hearing of the 
financial issues until a $3,300.00 fee was paid, the Utah Appeals Court ruled that the Appellant 
lacked standing to appeal this matter when first presented to it because the Appellant lacked a 
FINAL ORDER. However, as Exhibit # (document #3012) shows, Judge Medley issued 
a signed Minute Entry on the issue specifically stating that it was the last order on that issue, and 
thus does qualify with the Appeals Court as a Final Order or order to allow appeal of. As rules of 
Appellate procedure allow when an appeal can be taken: 
Consideration of an appeal can be heard by the Appeals court if the signed order by the Judge 
directs that his minute entry is a final order on the issue at hand (paraphrased) 
Thus, Dismissal of the appeal for lack of a final Order by the Appeals court and thus refusing 
hearing the issue of Todd Stone being denied access to the court until he pays the $3,700.00 
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attorney fee and copy cost amount was an error in dismissing Stone's appeal of that issue and 
ruling. However, now a Final Order has been issued this Appeal of the issue of whether the 
Appellant being blocked from the court was proper and constitutional given the Appellant 
even offered to deposit amounts with the court as bond as allowed under Rule 62, and 
discussed below. The issue of blocking the Appellant from court in-light of his mitigating 
financial matters and debt obligations of the Appellee that were paid for by the Appellant can now 
be properly considered by the Utah Appeals Court, and the injustice and prejudice such has placed 
upon the Appellant hopefully can be removed. 
Todd Stone Holds Legally Contracted Standing to seek action aeainst Appellee for 
Foreclosure Action of Mortgage Companies 
As per Exhibit # that show Todd Stone was a legally contracted party to the mortgages 
on the parties' marital residence, and such were joint marital debts. Utah Appeals Case # 2007-
0340 was ruled in error, stating Todd Stone was not a party to the foreclosure being sought 
against him, yet he was at that time, a Legally Contracted party to the mortgage company seeking 
foreclosure action against him and Joanne Stone. As a party to the contracted mortgage 
obligation that the Appellee (Joanne Stone) is also a party to and who failed to make the 
mortgage payments as is required of this divorce action, and thus the mortgage company sought 
collection and foreclosure action against Todd Stone. According to the March 7, 2006, and April 
20, 2006 District Court rulings, and the May 1, 2008 Appeals court affirming order, Todd Stone 
does hold standing to enlist court hearing of the foreclosure matters against Todd Stone & Joanne 
Stone, since both of them at the time of filing had NOT been dismissed from the respectively 
contracted mortgages. Since court actions are to consider aspects applicable at time of filing the 
action or paperwork, the issue is NOT moot now, because the Appellant still holds claim against 
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the Appellee for injury (financial and otherwise) sustained as a result of the Appellee's refusal to 
pay the court ordered mortgages. 
When the Foreclosure proceedings were instigated by both Mortgage companies for no payment 
from the Appellee, Todd Stone was, and continues to be harmed with the poor credit report, and 
prejudiced because of the actions of Joanne Stone, and her refusal to pay the contracted and court 
ordered monthly mortgage payments (June 21, & July 25, 2001, March 7, 2006, May 1, 2008 
court orders ordering that Joanne Stone is to pay the monthly mortgages on the Melony Drive 
Property). 
Appellant's Rieht to Post Supercedes Bond Was Improperly Denied 
The Appellant had appealed the court's refusal to allow the Appellant's financial issues to be 
heard until an attorney fee of $3,300.00 was paid, and even after the Appellant offered to pay 
funds directly to the court and held by the court until all issues are resolved (supercedes 
bond) by each party for equal to (or even a percentage of the) amounts in question, and still such 
right to have the Appellant's financial issues heard was denied even without the final ruling of the 
Utah Appellate Court on the Appellant's interlocutory appeal filed. Such action by Commissioner 
Casey to deny such a request from the Appellant to have the court hold the funds in question 
while all the issues are resolved, conflicts with other Utah Cases. Under the findings of: 
Pendleton, the court held that parties' rights should not be denied until after the court's 
ruling on appeal or Final Ruling. (This was presented to the court on Document # 3391, but 
ignored or overlooked by the court). 
As per Exhibit # , the ruling from the Utah Court of Appeals in case # 2007-0340, 
according to Rule 62-(g), 
"the power and authority to accept a bond to stay a judgement either pending appeal, or 
pending hearing of other matters, rests NOT ONLY with the Appellate Court, but with judges, 
and justices". 
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However, when the Appellant offered to pay an amount to the court or have other items of value 
held by the court for the $3,300.00 attorney fee assessment that the court was using as a ban from 
having the Appellant's financial issues properly heard. Commissioner Casey stated "he did not 
have the authority, and that was only held by the Appellate court", and thus rejected my offer 
for the court to hold funds, or some other security of value for that debt as is allowed by Rule 62. 
Such ruling of Commissioner Casey is in fact an error, that is NOT harmless to the Appellant. 
Additionally, Rule 62-( i2), states that a deposit of funds, or OTHER SECURITY in place of a 
commercial insurance bond may be held by the court to stay judgement pending appeal 
This is also contrary to Commissioner Casey's ruling against the Appellant, when the Appellant 
offered either to have funds held by the court, or sale proceeds held by the court, or the 
Appellant's $5,000.00 claim of funds the Appellee owes the Appellant as per the terms of the 
stipulated agreement, or other amounts held that are due the Appellant as security, all were ruled 
by Commissioner Casey as not applicable when presented to him, stating: Todd Stone is mistaken 
to think that because some funds are owed him that would offset the judgement of $3,300.00 he 
owes the Petitioner, (paraphrased). Under the provisions of Rule 62, the Appellant held merit to 
ask that funds that will be due the Appellant be held to offset the $3,300.00 amount that has been 
used as a ban from the Appellant seeking court intervention. The Appellee NEVER objected to 
such items of security being held by the court. 
Rule 62(j) also states, that it is the parties, NOT the judge that can object to the amount of bond 
or deposit held by the court. Thus, for Commissioner Casey to object to the amount, was an 
abuse of discretion as per the provisions of Rule 62(j). 
DOUBLE Mediation is NOT Proper Reason to Dismiss Scheduled Hearing 
As per Exhibit # , Document #2137, Commissioner Casey committed error, by dismissing 
the scheduled hearing for the parties to attend mediation, when Exhibit # (Document 
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#2110), clearly shows the parties attended mediation on July 7, 2006 for the issues presented for 
evidentiary hearing. The court error of cancellation of the scheduled hearing of August 21, 2006 
because having to still attend mediation (that they already had attended) caused the Appellant to 
loose the opportunity to have parent time visitation any time the children were off track from their 
school in August & September 2006, because the scheduling timeframe takes so long to re-start 
the scheduling series of hearings or events. Additionally it is noted that the court's error in 
sending notice of this ruling to the incorrect address for Todd Stone, as shown on 
document # 2138, caused even greater delay, and shows the court's propensity to commit 
error, even though given all the volumes of documents the court has sent to the Appellant 
at the correct address prior to this. 
Improperly Filed Affidavits should EQUALLY not be allowed to be considered 
Exhibit # , (document # 3373 & document # 1980) both show that counsel filed 
paperwork for the judgement of attorney fees under the incorrect case # ending in the #'s 17. 
Counsel has never corrected such error, and Neither has he, nor Commissioner Casey, who wrote 
the changes on the Affidavit case # ever given the Appellant a correct copy, (see the actual 
record in the file, rather than a photocopy) TfflS IS CONSIDERED DEFECTIVE NOTICE, and 
as such, the Affidavit should not be considered completely filed, and thus counsel's judgement for 
Attorney fees be stricken until completed correctly and notice is perfected to the Appellant. 
When this issue was presented to Commissioner Casey, the Appellant's claim was scoffed at by 
Commissioner Casey as shown in his minute entry of . Document # . 
Therefore, counsel's paperwork for award of the $3,300.00 attorney fees should be considered 
imperfect notice, and the award of the $3,300.00 assessment would no longer have been a bar to 
the Appellant seeing justice served on his other financial issues heard by the court. 
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Under equal application of the Law parameters, dismissing counsel's paperwork for not having a 
proper filed Affidavit would be the same as the court treated the Appellant. In July 2007, the 
court dismissed the Appellant's related filed paperwork for failing to have an affidavit filed 
properly with the Order to show cause. Thus, the court extended preferential treatment toward 
counsel when he failed to properly include his affidavit, but denied the Appellant his filing because 
it lacked a properly filed affidavit. This is a misapplication of justice, and thus Counsel's award of 
attorney fees stemming from his incorrectly 4-17-06 filed affidavit should be set aside until 
correctly filed by counsel. Furthermore, if properly once filed by counsel, and notice was not 
defective, the Appellant could then properly object to the filed attorney fees assessment. The 
Appellant has already filed objection to the attorney fee assessment, but such would then be 
considered timely. 
The court should not continue to reward and support counsel for an unjustly obtained judgement, 
by continuing to ban the Appellant from the court hearing the Appellant's financial matters 
seeking judgement against the Appellee for amounts that could have offset, or "netted against" 
amounts the Appellee stated was owed to her, thus supporting her failure to pay for the children's 
travel expenses for visitation in 2006, 2007, 2008, and not for Christmas 2008-New Years 2009. 
As Exhibit # (document # 3374 to 3382) show, the Appellee was too late according to 
the provisions of the Supplemental Decree in presenting the bill and amounts due more than 30 
days past their date for reimbursement, and thus, the Appellant should not, according to the 
provisions of the stipulated decree be required to pay the submitted medical costs that were 
submitted late. If a specification is stated in time frame, the court is bound to uphold that stated 
timeframe. The Appellant is not disputing an amount might be due, as much as the Appellant is 
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seeking the same preferential treatment extended to the Appellee in overlooking stated 
timeframes, be extended to the Appellant in stated timeframes as well. This would be considered 
equal application of the justice system for both parties. If the court rejected the Appellant's 
paperwork for being two days past the deadline like it did, then the Appellee's submitted medical 
bills that were submitted late should also be denied or dismissed for the Appellee's claim as well. 
However, the judgement of October 19, 2007 against the Appellant for medical bills included over 
$400.00 of bills submitted untimely or late to the Appellant. Additionally, the paperwork (# 3377, 
3378, 3379) were too poorly printed and too hard to determine the proper amounts. When this 
issue was presented to the court by the Appellant, it was ignored by the court. 
There was no need for the court to keep canceling and re-scheduling the contempt hearing or 
visitation matters from April 18, 2006 (as per document # 2142) when the issues were first 
certified for trial, til October 19, 2007, because under Rule 20-(a)-(5), that states the Appellant 
did not have to be present in the court hearing to determine what visitation the Appellant could 
have with the children and who was to pay for the travel related costs. However, the Appellee 
continued to use such to her advantage, even asking the court in January 2005 to delay the 
scheduled hearing until the Appellee's Mother could recover from knee surgery. The Mother 
never had the "scheduled" knee surgery at the December 2006, or January 2007 time as 
represented would occur by the Appellee. Finally the court saw through the Appellee's attempt 
to delay unjustly and the Appellee was then forced to reveal the cancer treatment and medical 
condition of the parties' oldest daughter, that up until January 2007 that medical information was 
totally kept from the Appellant, and not disclosed to him. 
Appellant's Claim for Refunded Custody Evaluation Funds 
As Exhibit # (Document # 3293 & 3294) Shows Commissioner Casey issued ruling (Item 
#1) supports that the Appellant holds claim for any action of the Appellee that arose after August 
1, 2005. THEREFORE, the Checks to Matt Davies paid by the Appellee from the parties' joint 
funds at America First Credit Union account hold merit to be heard by the court, and are not 
Moot. Yet refused to allow any such evidence or facts to be presented to it, thinking all such 
matters were covered by the Supplemental Decree. See Exhibit # of checks ( $575.00 & 
$575.00) transacted and the August 30, 2005 withdrawal for Appellee's personal use are 
documents from the America First Credit Union, showing Appellee withdrew for her own use 
$539.90 on August 30, 2005, and checks to Matt Davies were cashed August 3, 2005 and the 
amounts returned to the Appellee's counsel Brent Chipman afterwards. All of these actions 
occurred AFTER the August 1, 2005 date when Commissioner Casey ruled would be "new" 
issues of the Appellant may hold merit to present to the court, and were also never disclosed by 
the Appellee. 
These actions of the Appellee alone equate about $1,700.00 plus interest that the Appellee should 
be found to have taken from the parties marital account and not returned to the account, and thus 
should be found for the Appellant to hold claim against the Appellee for such funds, since the 
Appellant was contractually liable for the America First Credit Union funds when the Appellee 
failed to pay the monthly loan payments in 2005 & 2006. See Exhibit # , that shows the 
funds from America First Credit Union are joint funds of the Appellant and the Appellee, and no 
one else is liable for its payment. Additional "new" items that were presented to the court for 
resolution or hearing, was the 4/13/06, 5/25/06, Repossession fees totaling $278.80 (See 
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Document #2108) that America First Credit Union charged the joint account of Todd Stone & 
Joanne Stone, to take possession of the Melony Drive property, since Joanne Stone had 
abandoned the property, and left it unattended. Again, the court refused to allow these "new" 
issues to be reviewed or heard by the court. 
When Appellee's counsel received the refunded Custody Evaluation fees from Matt Davies, that 
had been paid out of the parties' joint account to Matt Davies, the Appellee but never returned or 
re-deposited in the parties' joint marital account the funds that were from it. Furthermore, item # 
6 & 7 of the same Ruling of Commissioner Casey, further supports that the Appellant NOT 
release any lien filed against the Appellee's property interests when he ruled: 
"...that the Appellant may hold claim to the future sales proceeds the Appellee might 
receive when she elects to sell the parties properties, that are for the obligations of the 
Petitioner" (Appellee). 
Therefore, the Appellant held merit to retain his liens against the Appellee's ownership interest in 
the parties' property, and the finding of contempt against the Appellant in the October 19, 2007 
hearing was unjust and unwarranted. 
Court Should not Issue Ruling based on Assumptions, Only on Facts Presented 
Contracts that have not been entered into court specifically prevent the Appellee from renting out 
the Melony Drive property, but since they have not been entered into court yet, they cannot be 
presented here, or renting of the property cannot be assumed as an option for remedy at this time, 
because NO rental options have either been entered in the court as well, so must not be 
considered as well at this time, by this court. Under the ruling of Olympus: the Court held it is 
not to infer contradictory duties or terms of a contract that are not present or presented 
such that the court is not to infer or assume that Joanne could rent the Melony Drive property, when the 
mortgage contract precluded such, and the property owner failed to concur with such rental. 
59 
September 13, 2006, Appellant filed with the court Document #2153, Motion for contempt, 
pointing out to the court the provisions of the parties' mortgage contract that Joanne Stone had 
violated, and also the distinct differences between mortgage financial responsibility and Quit 
Claim Deeds regarding ownership title to a parcel of property. Just because a party is a listed 
owner of a property does NOT require that party to be one same party financially responsible for 
that property. Hence, Annabelle Stone is NOT financially responsible for the mortgage obligation 
that existed on the Melony Drive property at August 3, 2005 or time since while the Wells Fargo , 
or America First Credit Union mortgages existed, and these proceedings occurring, and these 
filings were made. See Exhibit # , Document #2153. 
The Trial Court is in error to think they can alter or modify terms of a joint mortgage contract 
that Joanne Stone entered into, and fails to conform to its payment terms now, or to think that 
Annabelle Stone is financially responsible for the financial obligations of the contracted mortgage 
Joanne Stone entered into. Annabelle Stone IS NOT financially liable for the debt obligations of 
Joanne Stone, yet the Trial Court still acts and is of the false idea that Annabelle Stone should be 
financially liable for Joanne Stone's debts. Annabelle Stone HAS NEVER signed any 
documentation of suretyship for Joanne Stone. According to Utah's Uniform Commercial Code 
Statutes, anytime one assumes the debts of another, that must be in writing and signed by the 
parties. Such was never the case with Annabelle Stone & Joanne Stone, and thus Annabelle 
Stone should not be held or considered by the District Court to have to pay the debts of Joanne 
Stone. 
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Trial Court STILL tries to hold Annabelle Stone Financially Liable in the divorce 
Proceedings 
Additionally, the Trial Court continues to attempt to hold Annabelle Stone liable to continue to 
pay the expenses of Joanne Stone, when in document # 3463 where Commissioner Casey states in 
the same minute entry ruling noted above without even holding a hearing or inquiring of 
Annabelle Stone (Appellant's Mother) directly, or held hearing of the Appellant's financial means 
or employment status given the lengthy time the Appellant was unemployed and injured, thus 
demonstrating Commissioner Casey's personal bias or prejudice against Appellant or his Mother, 
and uses such to continue to deny the Appellant the opportunity to have the financial issues of the 
Appellant properly and impartially heard, when Commissioner Casey stated, ore ruled: 
"...the Respondent has access to some financial resources... The Respondent's Mother has 
previously advanced Respondentfunds, ...he was also awarded his retirement... The 
commissioner therefore concludes the Respondent has the means to satisfy the fees against 
him considering its modest cost". 
Commissioner Casey in his ruling above acted contrary to the specific language of Item # 49 of 
the parties decree as shown in Exhibit # that specifically states: 
Any problems incurred in carrying out the terms of the Supplemental Decree, based on the 
ownership interests of Mrs. Annabelle Stone in the real property described herein, SHALL 
NOT affect the settlement provisions regarding custody and parent time'9. 
In Commissioner Casey's ruling above about Annabelle Stone's resources and her ability to 
continue to pay fees, it not only interferes with Parent time for the Appellant, but it also shows a 
court action in Commissioner Casey's court to enforce the parent time provisions of the 
Supplemental Decree cannot be heard, thus further interfering with the Appellant's right to 
enforcement of decreed or statutory parent time. Such attitude of Annabelle Stone by 
Commissioner Casey without hearing facts and evidence or testimony of Annabelle Stone shows 
Commissioner Casey's error in judgement or lack of independence. 
Because of the court's ruling in and subsequent remand ofFinlayson, that "the Court cannot 
enforce or find valid a ruling that is ambiguous as to the payment of debts to other parties". 
The parties' Supplemental Decree, that requires Annabelle Stone to sell the parties' property, and 
is ambiguous as to how the remaining sales proceeds beyond the first $40,000.00 is to be divided 
or shared, is ambiguous, and should be found invalid and overturned. Additionally, in this matter, 
Annabelle Stone should not be viewed by the court to be financially responsible for the mortgage 
debts of Joanne Stone, yet the court seems to think otherwise, that Annabelle Stone is responsible 
to pay the contracted debts of Joanne Stone. Furthermore, the Woodward Court held that the 
court errs in basing a decision on a conclusion; rather than on the facts presented to them. 
In addition to ruling that Annabelle Stone has the financial resources to for the costly effects of 
the actions and penalties of the Appellee, or attorney fees for the Appellant, is in violation of 
ruling based only on facts presented and valid presented evidence. Instead, Commissioner Casey 
has ruled many times based on his inaccurate assumptions rather than on the facts or evidence, as 
presented or never allowed to be presented in court as shown above regarding the Financial 
resources of Annabelle Stone. 
Prior Order NOT to separate custody from property held merit 
As shown in Document #3360, another reason supporting setting aside the $3,300.00 attorney 
fee assessment against the Appellant so other financial matters can be properly heard, is part of 
the $3,300.00 assessment was against the Appellant because of the court's perceived waste of the 
court's time for the Appellant's filed motion NOT to separate the custody from the property 
issues. Appellant filed motion to vacate Attorney Fee assessment against the Appellant because 
assessment of attorney fees against the Appellant was contrary to the prior rulings of the court in 
2003, when the court refused to separate custody from property issues. Yet in 2005, when the 
Appellant filed motion to NOT separate custody from property issues, in compliance with the 
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2003 Res judicata ruling of the court, the Appellant was assessed this $3,300.00 attorney fees 
assessment for wasting the court's time on something without merit. 
HealthCare Insurance Premium Cost is Calculated Incorrectly 
The Parties Supplemental Decree specifically states the requirement is only V2 of the actual cost of 
the children's insurance, not the cost for the Appellee's insurance as well and was argued in court 
and submitted as amounts to adjust the judgment by but were not considered by the court. 
Clarification of Thanksgivin2 visitation 
Determination as to what statutory visitation was applicable at what time, based on the 
contradictory terms of the relocation statute (Ut Code 30-3-37 Thanksgiving in ODD #'rd years) 
and the standard visitation statute (Ut Code 30-3-35 Thanksgiving in even #'rd years) and the 
effective dates or application of either statute since the supplemental decree was so vague and 
signed after such long delay with Thanksgiving 2005 visitation being denied all together. See 
page 3 of Commissioner Casey's September 6, 2007 Docketed page # 3749 Exhibit # . 
THIS APPEAL SEEKS RELIEF OF THE COURT IN THE FOLLOWING: 
1. Determination of what is Pro rata insurance premium costs. 
2. Determination of when an order is binding upon the parties and effective for the courts when 
it is not signed for almost 6 months later. 
3. Determination that a party can seek modification, or recision of a stipulated agreement prior 
to the date the court signs the order. 
4. Establishment that the Appellant did everything he vcould to get the District Court to "fix" the 
problems of the Supplemental Decree and still the District Court refused to consider any such 
fact or evidence. 
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5. Reversal of judgement and attorney fees against the Appellant since most of the attorney fees 
accrued prior to the court's signing (Effective Date) directing both parties were to pay their 
own attorney fees, thus removing the $3,300.00 ban against the Appellant's issues from being 
heard, also since under rule for perfected notice, and supercedes bond, Appellant held right to 
have such set aside during appeal. 
6. Remand this case back to District Court for enforcement of the Appellee pay her financial 
obligations and issue judgement in favor of the Appellant. 
7. Allow "netting" or offsetting amounts due from either party to negate or reduce amounts due 
the other party. 
8. Appellant to pay for medical bills she failed to disclose plan benefits for, or medical conditions 
of the children about, or were submitted late to the Appellant, or were denied by Appellant's 
insurance plan because of incomplete information. 
9. Allow Appellant lower child support Nunc Pro Tunc based on his unforeseen disability and 
lost wages and decreased wage capacity and per state guidelines for calculating amount, and 
for payments Petitioner has received in lieu of Child Support. 
10. Establish schedule in the order of the court as to when child support is lowered and to what 
amount when each child emancipates or graduates 
11. Issue Judgement in favor of the Appellant for amounts lost due to the Appellee's false claim 
of amounts owed her for Income Tax claiming advantages, travel expenses she did not have to 
pay, and for future expenses and tax advantages to compensate the Appellant for what was 
lost, and order the parties file amended Income Tax Returns for periods effected. 
12. Sanction Counsel and Appellee for their conduct and actions and misrepresentations and 
delay and harm such has caused. 
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13. Find the Appellee in multiple counts of contempt and reverse Custody of the minor children 
because of the demonstrated conduct of the Appellee and lack of moral turpitude and 
propensity to deny the Appellant frequent, meaningful such visitation. 
14. Adjust subsequent rulings and orders of the court that have been affected or prejudiced by the 
Appellee's actions and conduct not having been heard or had to be paid for by her. 
15. Setting aside the District Court Ban on Appellant from having his financial issues heard in 
court, so all of the applicable matters and the Appellee's conduct can be heard and ruled on by 
the court. 
16. Reassignment of hearing the Appellant's issues to a different court. 
17. Dismissal of the this orders' and subsequent orders of Attorney Fees assessed against the 
Appellant. 
18. Dismissal of all monetary judgements against the Appellant until amounts "netted" with 
amounts owed the Appellant. 
19. Issue Judgement and Ruling that Appellee is financially responsible for payment of the total 
amounts of the Wells Fargo, and America First Credit Union mortgages along with all 
applicable charges and penalties resulting from the Appellee's reckless conduct and failure to 
pay them as the court had ordered, with a finding of contempt against the Appellee for her 
refusal to comply with such court orders. 
20. A non-dischargeable judgement against the Appellee in favor of the Appellant for all amounts 
due from the Appellee to the Appellant since the Appellee already has the same advantages of 
a non-dischargeable judgement for amounts owed her as medical expenses, insurance cost, as 
is Child Support. 
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21. Since Each party is facing financial difficulties, allow each party a process of "netting" or 
offsetting credit for each party as to amounts owed each other including each parties' medical 
therapy, and HealthCare premium costs for the children, and as payments in lieu of future 
child support before any judgements enter against either party. 
22. Ruling that the medical insurance costs of coverage for the children is based on the actual 
increase in premium cost of the minor children from what insurance coverage is just for the 
Appellee, rather than splitting the entire HealthCare premium cost for the Appellee and the 
children. The Appellant should not be faced with having to pay insurance premium for the 
Appellee's health insurance, just the children's health insurance coverage. 
23. Finding Appellee in contempt each time for failing to facilitate or provide travel for the 
children's visitation for all specified visitation times in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and the 
costs she escaped having to pay assessed as judgement against her for use for make up 
visitation and future visitation expenses of the Appellant. 
24. Since the visitation was obstructed for such long period of time by the actions of the Appellee, 
and such is and was not in the best interests of all three of the parties' children, since much 
harm or prejudice against the Appellant was caused while the oldest child was still a minor, 
and still caries such deep feelings against her Father that still serve to harm or tear apart her 
relationship with the Appellant, allow the children's Mental health counseling with a selected 
Board certified Psychiatrist or Psychologist specializing in such children's matters to 
specifically include the Appellant in the counseling and treatment sessions or therapies, so that 
the children may begin to hopefully mend the fractured relationship with their father for events 
that may have been the acts of the Appellee, and the related expense be the responsibility of 
the Appellee's insurance provider and Appellee, including travel costs for such. This is 
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additionally important because it is not known if the negative comments or influence upon the 
other two minor children is coming from the Appellee or the oldest child, that still resides in 
the same home. 
25. Order periods of "make up" visitation that all three children (since the oldest child was a 
minor at the time visitation with her was lost) to enjoy with their Father in the amount of 
double (either days, or periods) that which was lost because of the disingenuous attitude and 
conduct of the Appellee causing prior visitation not to be allowed to occur with such travel 
costs assessed against the Appellee, for the "make up" visitation. Such "make up" visitation is 
not to diminish the Appellant's afforded visitation with his children that is already part of the 
parties Supplemental Decree. 
26. Judgement against the Appellee for the amount of travel costs she would have paid for the 
almost thirty round trip tickets (10 trips for three children for all the visitation trips the 
Appellee was responsible to pay travel costs for 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 that were lost or not 
allowed to occur) [Appellee was responsible for paying travel costs for 3 times per year, for 3 
children, each year. She has only paid for 1 trip for 2 children to visit their father in Utah]). 
Had the Appellee complied with the order to pay the children's travel costs for the visitation 
periods of 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, the Appellee would have had to face significant 
expense, but was benefited by not complying with the order of the court. The Appellee 
should not be afforded financial gain or benefit for failing to act in the Best Interests of the 
children, or because she violated the court orders on visitation. This judgement can be in the 
form of travel expense credits for round trip or one way trips by the Appellant for times when 
the travel costs are to be paid by the Appellant, until used in full. 
27. Given the previous conduct of the Appellee, Order an Evidentiary hearing to be held and 
evidence and parenting plans obtained from each parent, with the interview of witnesses, 
professionals, and each parent as to determination of parental conduct of the past and in the 
future, for court determination of what is in the best interests of the children with specificity 
that the estrangement or distance created by prior actions or disparagement negatively 
affecting the children against the Appellant, or current distance in their relationship with their 
father that was created by the Appellee, not be considered to benefit the Appellee in such 
findings or evidentiary hearing. Under the ruling of Hudema, the Appellate Court re-
affirmed that "... the Trial Court MUST examine the moral character of the parent having 
custody or denied custody". Also under the ruling of Elmer, the court emphasized that the 
paramount consideration MUST be promoting the child9s best interests (emphasis added). 
Thus, with the wording of "must", it shows the court's emphasis for the required action from 
the court to promote the child's Best Interest. However, without allowing the Respondent 
into court, how can the District Court perform what they MUST do or must consider to 
promote the Best Interests of the child, or to consider the moral character of the Petitioner? 
The costs of such shall be equally shared by each party at the time costs are due, not merely 
credit issued to the other party because of the parties strained financial position, with each 
party paying their own ongoing attorney fees at the time incurred, so as to protect the 
property equity from possible Attorney lien. 
28. Order that all medical information on all the children be fully disclosed and access to the all 
three children's medical provides at the time the children were minors be allowed the 
Appellant since both Utah law affords the Appellant such right, and the Appellee is asking for 
medical cost of the children to be paid for by the Appellant, such information is needed for the 
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Appellant's medical insurance coverage claims. Any costs or fees for such should be the 
financial responsibility of the Appellee. Any claim considered untimely should not be the 
financial responsibility of the Appellant, since it was the conduct and actions of the Appellee 
that caused such untimely claim. 
29. Finding that given the Appellees' other fees and costs paid by the Appellant, that the 
Appellant was current on his child support amount and thus was entitled to claim his rightful 
income tax deductions with judgement against Appellee for the amount of amount of income 
Tax deduction lost by the Appellant with costs born by the Appellee. 
30. Allow the Appellant a Nunc Pro Tunc Reduction of child support amount to be considered 
since the Appellant filed a "Motion to modify child support rather than a "Petition to modify 
child support" back in 2005, and yet such was denied and assessed Attorney fees for taking 
the court's time. Since the Supplemental Decree was "signed" by the court January 9 2006, 
Commissioner Casey ruled in his March 7, 2006 ruling that the Motion to lower child support 
was not applicable because the parties' supplemental decree was signed after the industrial 
accident, and thus assessed the Appellant attorney fees for his three prior filings addressing 
lowering child support as a waste of the court's time. However, Commissioner Casey in his 
September 6, 2007 ruling (page 5 item # 7 document #'s 3751 & 3752 Exhibit # ) 
states "The parties' stipulation was binding upon the parties when it was stated on the record 
August 3, 2005 which is prior to the Appellant's industrial accident), and the 
stipulation... continues to bind the parties...". Thus, the Appellant's filed Motions to modify 
Child Support were appropriate to have been filed, and should have been allowed proper 
consideration of the facts and evidence of the Appellant's injury and inability to pay the stated 
Child Support amount. 
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31. Interest of 10% on prejudgements amounts awarded to Appellant from Appellee calculated 
from the original filing date in 2005, or 2006 when the initial paperwork was filed 
32. A clarification ruling as to what party is financially responsible for the mortgage obligation 
when A Quit Claim Deed is signed by one of the property owners. The Question remains in 
these proceedings of either: 1. Is it as Commissioner Casey feels and has expressed, that 
Annabelle Stone is now financially responsible for the contracted debts of Joanne Stone and 
Todd Stone, or 2. is it as the standard mortgage practice is, the original contracted parties, 
(Joanne Stone and Todd Stone) are still financially responsible for payment of the mortgage 
liability regardless of who owns the property now. At issue, is when Todd Stone Quit 
Claimed his ownership interest to Annabelle Stone, such transfer was only transferring his 
ownership equity interest, NOT transferring as well his mortgage obligation, because, the 
mortgage company did not enter into legally binding contract with Annabelle Stone, just 
Joanne Stone & Todd Stone. Hence, a District Court (as the Federal Bankruptcy Court has 
stated numerous times) does not hold the authority to "re-write" the terms or parties to a 
mortgage contract. Hence, Based on the Appellate Court ruling of May 1, 2008 in this case, 
ONLY JOANNE STONE, is liable for the mortgage debt tied to the Melony Drive Property 
that she elected to reside in and assume, NOT Annabelle Stone. Since Joanne Stone 
voluntarily elected to stop making the payments on the Melony Drive residence to both Wells 
Fargo Mortgage, and America First Mortgage causing then the mortgage companies to then 
come after Todd Stone for collection, shows Todd Stone holds merit to seek court 
intervention in this divorce case against Joanne Stone. However, Commissioner Casey is of 
the personal bias, that Todd Stone does not hold standing to bring the issue to this divorce 
case. However, the Parties' Supplemental Decree ruled by Judge Medley on January 9, 2006 
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is no way binding in any way upon Annabelle Stone either for payment of mortgage amounts, 
or directive to sell any property. Additionally, Todd Stone can not be found in contempt for 
failing to sell something he does not own, or transferred his equity interest in 2003, with the 
court not having an order preventing such, as Commissioner Casey is of the bias opinion that 
Todd Stone did wrong by transferring his ownership equity to Annabelle Stone. 
33. Dismissal of the court's subsequent finding of contempt against the Appellant for failure to 
release his liens against the property interest of the Appellee, because the March 5, 2007 
ruling (document # 3293) of Commissioner Casey supported that the Appellant may hold 
claim to the future sales proceeds the Appellee may receive when she sells the property. 
34. Award of attorney fees and legal costs of this brief and other related representations for the 
Appellant. 
35. Demand an accounting of all funds Brent Chipman received for and behalf of the Appellee, 
since he misused the trust funds given to him by attorney Del Findley for Appellant's Income 
Tax refund, that in turn were for Matt Davies, but instead were taken from the Appellee, thus 
causing her to have to take the same amount of $1,750.00 from the America First Credit 
Union account to pay such bill that the income tax refund was to have paid. Also demand of 
an accounting of other funds Brent Chipman received from either source for Appellee, like the 
Matt Davies refund fees etc. 
36. Finding that the Appellee failed to act in the best interests of the children by failing to 
transport them to see and spend frequent statutory visitation time with their father, thus 
causing the Father Daughter relationship to be strained and subsequent $3,000.00 of 
counseling and therapy sessions to help mend the fractured relationship that had occurred 
because the children were not able to see their father for about three years, are the expense of 
the Appellee, that she still fails to pay. See Exhibit # . 
37. Correction of State Statute of the contradictory terms of visitation for Thanksgiving periods 
in the Relocation statute vs. the standard visitation guidelines. (Ut Code 30-3-37 
Thanksgiving in ODD #'rd years) and the standard visitation statute (Ut Code 30-3-35 
Thanksgiving in even #'rd years) 
38. Appellee be ordered to pay the property taxes and homeowners insurance on the Melony 
Drive property that would have been a part of the monthly mortgage payment the Appellee 
was ordered to pay and did not pay on an ongoing basis until the properties are sold. 
39. Full disclosure of medical information of all three of the children so the Appellant's medical 
insurance can be used to pay for the medical conditions of the children. See document # 3733 
to 3735 & document 3736 to 3739 for full disclosure of other pertinent and significant 
information filed with the court on August 31, 2007 but never heard or allowed proper 
consideration. Appellee's filed paperwork from September 4, 2007 (document # 3740) was 
allowed consideration by the court on October 19, 2007 hearing but the Appellant's filed 
paperwork was denied consideration by the court. Here, in the Appellee's filed paperwork, 
the Appellee was asking for an evidentiary hearing of the Appellant's failure to pay various 
expenses, and yet no evidence submitted by the Appellant was rejected by the court as 
"financial matters", and not "visitation matters". This allowed the Appellee to "net together 
for credit" her share of travel costs for the children, medical insurance costs, child support, 
medical expenses, and attorney fees together, but denied the Appellant the same right to "net 
together for credit" his portion or his payments made by him that have caused to benefit or 
pay the financial responsibilities of the Appellee. Even when the Appellant offered to disclose 
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his income and property the court rejected such information from being allowed to be 
presented, as the transcript shows. The Appellee was not required to disclose her income or 
employment information. 
40. Finding that the Appellee was in contempt for her actions that caused the children not to be 
transported to Utah for their statutory visitation with their Father for Fall 2005, Thanksgiving 
2005 or Christmas 2005, Easter 2006, Summer 2006, Fall 2006, Thanksgiving or Christmas 
2006, Easter 2007, Summer 2007, even though the Appellee held more than sufficient funds in 
the bank to pay for such travel related expenses for the children but blatantly refused to act in 
the children's best interest, so as to strain the relationship they held with their father the 
Appellant. See Exhibit # of Appellee's bank statement balance showing she had 
the funds available to pay the travel expenses she was responsible for, and still refused to do 
so. 
41. Prejudgement rate of 10% interest against the Appellee, since such is shown to be acceptable 
in other court practice. The Post Judgment rate can be 10%, or what amount is ruled in 
excess of the standard applicable mortgage rates applicable to the mortgage loans the 
Appellee failed to maintain, so as not to afford the Appellee advantageous interest rates more 
favorable than she would have had to pay had she complied with the orders of the court, and 
maintained the two mortgages. Wells Fargo Mortgage was a fixed Rate loan with an 
annualized interest Rate higher than 6.5%, and the America First Credit Union loan interest 
rate was a higher variable rate to be calculated 
Dated 1 / 7 ,2009 Signed: f V$. 
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